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Entrepreneurship: The Case of India
Arvind Panagariya1
Digital Revolution has been sweeping across the world 
over the last three decades. This revolution has spread 
far more rapidly, especially in developing countries, 
than was the case with either the Industrial or Agricul-
tural Revolution. Indeed, the spread has been so rapid 
that China has become its major driver with India 
emerging as one as well.
This paper is devoted to two aspects of  the Digital Rev-
olution as it impacts India: financial technology or fin-
tech, and innovation and entrepreneurship. As in other 
countries, the spread of  digital technologies has led to 
a dramatic transformation of  financial infrastructure 
in India. On the one hand, this has improved efficiency 
and on the other it has led to increased financial inclu-
sion. The government’s payments system has evolved 
to a point that it can make payments directly to indi-
viduals and firms through bank accounts. Individuals 
are seamlessly able to transfer funds from their bank 
accounts to those of  others. Businesses and customers 
can transact digitally in real time.
Digital technologies have also helped democratize 
innovation and entrepreneurship. Unlike conven-
tional technologies, digital innovations are less costly 
to commercialize on average. Scaling up of  conven-
tional innovations requires a large volume of  invest-
ment. In contrast, many digital innovations lend 
themselves to scaling up at low costs. As a result, in 
the digital space, innovators themselves are often seen 
as turning into entrepreneurs. The sharp division 
between innovators and entrepreneurs that existed in 
the past has greatly diminished.
I divide the paper into three parts. Part 1 focuses on 
the spread of  financial technologies in India. Part 2 
considers how the digital revolution has helped spawn 
and transform the nature of  entrepreneurship in the 
country. Part 3 offers some concluding remarks
1 Financial Technologies
While there is no consensus definition of  fintech, the 
term is most commonly used to refer to technologically 
enabled financial innovations with applications in such 
areas as transfer of  funds and payments, borrowing and 
lending, asset management and insurance. The activi-
ties that define fintech include: payments and transfers 
using mobile apps, investments in and payments via 
crypto-currencies, peer-to-peer lending and insurance, 
crowd sourcing via platforms such as Kickstarter, loan 
and insurance comparison websites, and robo-advice 
on both investment and asset management.
In developed countries, we think of  fintech as largely a 
private-sector phenomenon consisting of  transactions 
between and among businesses and households. If  I 
were to follow the same approach in describing the 
role of  financial technology in India, I would miss a 
large part of  the role that technology is playing there in 
revolutionizing the payments system. This is especially 
true when we are considering the area of  the economy 
in which financial technology intersects with inclusion 
and development. For this reason, in discussing the role 
of  financial technology in India, I will take a broader 
view of  it along two dimensions. First, I will include 
in financial technology the role that technology plays 
in transactions in which the government is one of  the 
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parties. Second, in defining financial technology, I will 
include all cashless transactions, whether or not they 
involve the use of  the latest innovations or mobile-based 
applications. As I will discuss later, equipping individ-
uals and households to transact digitally through such 
instrumentalities as the Business Correspondent model 
and payment banks represents a major step towards 
financial inclusion in a poor country like India.
1.1  Actors in the Economy and 
Transactions Among Them
For a poor country with per-capita income at approx-
imately $2000 per annum in current dollars in 2018, 
India has deployed financial technologies on a sur-
prisingly large scale. In the following, I will outline the 
components of  the infrastructure that India has built 
to bring digital modes of  transaction to individuals and 
households. I will also explain how the government 
has been using this infrastructure to disburse the ben-
efits under its various social schemes among the poor 
and what role businesses are playing in the spread of  
fintech in India.
But as an introduction to this discussion, it is useful 
to first consider a schematic chart providing the trans-
actions that take place in an economy among various 
groups of  actors. It is the efficiency of  these transac-
tions that fintech can greatly improve. In Table 1, I 
identify three broad groups of  actors in the economy: 
Government (G), Households (H) and Businesses (B) 
where I include all entities other than the government 
and households such as non-profit institutions in busi-
nesses. The table illustrates types of  transactions that 
take place among these three entities in India.
Table 1: Illustrative List of Transactions Among Major Actors in the Economy
Transacting Parties Transaction
Government   Government • Employee payroll, pension, insurance • Centrally Sponsored Schemes• Devolution of revenues to states
Government   Households • Direct Benefit Transfers (DBT) • Income tax by individuals to government• NREGA wages
Government   Businesses • Procurement of goods and services • Central Sector Schemes• Subsidies • GST, Tolls, Custom Duties, Corporate tax
Households   Households • Loans • Rental• Transfers
Households   Businesses • Sales of goods and services • Loans, investments• Salaries, pensions, health benefits
Businesses   Businesses • Input purchases, wholesale transactions • Transport services• Loans
As Table 1 illustrates, myriad transactions take place 
within and among government, households and busi-
nesses. Technology offers opportunities to reduce fric-
tion and raise productivity in the conduct of  these 
transactions. But this requires the building of  platforms 
that can intermediate the transactions. During the past 
decade, India has been engaged in building many of  
these platforms. The process is far from complete but 
considerable progress has been made.
1.2  Bringing Digital Technologies  
to All
One of  the most important developments in building 
financial-technology infrastructure in India is related 
to individuals and households. The ability to complete 
transactions through non-cash, digital means requires 
verification of  identity, having a bank account and 
access to instruments of  digital communication such 
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as mobile phones. Access to investment and savings 
instruments also requires access to financial services 
conventionally provided through brick and mortar 
bank branches but now feasible via digital platforms. 
In recent years, India has made considerable progress 
along each of  these dimensions.
1.2.1 Aadhaar: A Biometric Identity for All
If  an individual is to engage in a financial transaction 
without using cash, the first thing she needs is a proof  
of  identity. In a vast country such as India, where two-
thirds of  the population still lives in rural areas with 
many of  these areas in remote locations, giving indi-
viduals proof  of  identity is a huge challenge. Indeed, 
until less than a decade ago, India had no systematic 
program of  providing a proof  of  identity to its resi-
dents. In principle, anyone could apply for a passport 
or driver’s license, but with the relevant offices located 
in far off places and many individuals lacking the basic 
documents required to complete the applications for 
them, it was not a practical option for most, especially 
women living in rural areas.
Surprisingly, today, nearly all residents of  India have 
an identity card called the Aadhaar identity card. The 
process of  issuing the card was kicked off in Septem-
ber 2010 and today there are 1.2 billion of  such cards 
in existence. Each of  these cards gives a definitive 
proof  of  identity to an individual backed by biomet-
ric data. The Aadhaar card carries the name, gender, 
address, a 12-digit unique number and a photo of  the 
individual. A simple instrument connected by Wi-Fi 
to a central database can scan the fingerprints and 
iris of  the individual and match them against those 
stored in the database to verify whether she is who 
she claims to be.
How such a massive task of  collecting biometric data 
and issuing the Aadhaar cards could be accomplished 
in such as short period of  time in the contentious 
democracy that is India is itself  a fascinating tale. Its 
details can be found in a recent book entitled “Reboot-
ing India” by Nandan Nilekani and Viral Shah. In this 
book, the authors also provide a roadmap of  how the 
Aadhaar identity can be leveraged to take advantage 
of  many other technologies. Thanks to the Aadhaar 
project, Indian residents today have technologically 
the most advanced and reliable proof  of  identity. The 
beauty of  this identity is that the individual need not 
carry a card with her to prove who she is. The proof  is 
always there in her palms and eyes.
1.2.2  The Jan-Dhan Scheme:  
Bank Accounts for All
Proof  of  identity is just the starting point for promot-
ing financial inclusion. By itself, it does not go very far. 
Its power is realized only when combined with other 
financial instruments. The most basic of  such instru-
ments is a bank account. Whatever other instruments 
private actors in the fintech industry make available 
must build on the bank account. Checks, credit cards, 
and wallets can be operated efficiently only if  the indi-
vidual using them has a bank account.
Creating banking infrastructure over its vast expanse 
has also been a challenge for India. Opening bank 
branches in villages with populations less than one 
thousand is not cost effective. In the 1980s, India 
experimented with spreading bank branches to the 
remote corners of  the country using public funds but 
the experiment proved costly. In the end, it had to 
be given up on that initiative after the launch of  the 
1991 economic reforms. According to the Global Findex 
Report by the World Bank, only 53% of  Indians above 
15 years of  age had bank accounts in 2014.2
One of  the first major initiatives that Prime Minis-
ter Narendra Modi launched after he came to office 
was Prime Minister’s Jana Dhan Yojana (PMJDY). 
Translated literally, it means People’s Wealth Scheme. 
PMJDY is a large-scale financial inclusion effort 
through a dramatic expansion of  bank accounts. 
Announced during his first Independence Day address 
after coming to office by the Prime Minister on August 
15, 2014, the initiative went on to set a world record 
for the largest number of  bank accounts opened in 
one week. This record now finds a place in the Guin-
ness Book of  Records, which states, “The most bank 
accounts opened in 1 week as a part of  a financial 
inclusion campaign is 18,096,130 and was achieved 
by Banks in India from 23 to 29 August 2014.” The 
government accomplished the task by getting the pub-
lic sector banks to organize camps around the country 
where individuals could line up and successfully open 
a bank account within a few hours. According to the 
Global Findex Report of  the World Bank, the proportion 
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of  Indians above 15 years of  age with bank accounts 
had reached 80 percent in 2017. As of  February 28, 
2018, the total number of  accounts under the scheme 
stood at 312 million and deposits in these accounts 
amounted to $12 billion.3 A significant proportion of  
the households still do not use bank accounts as instru-
ments of  savings and investment, however.
Since its launch, the government has added several fea-
tures to the Jana Dhana accounts to promote inclusion. 
RuPay debit cards can be issued on the accounts. As of  
January 2016, banks had issued 247 million such debit 
cards.4 The accounts also entitle the holder to an acci-
dental insurance for $1500. Six months after opening 
the account, the holder is eligible for $75 in overdraft. 
Account holders can also engage in mobile banking 
using even feature phones through National Unified 
USSD Platform (NUUP).
1.2.3  Digital Connectivity:  
A mobile in Every Hand
Once an individual has the proof  of  identity and a 
bank account, she is only a mobile phone away from 
acquiring the power to transact digitally. India’s good 
fortune was that by the time the Aadhaar and Jana 
Dhan Accounts were launched, the mobile revolution 
was already under way. This revolution spread across 
the length and breadth of  India during the first decade 
of  the millennium.
I grew up in India in an era in which telephone was 
considered an absolute luxury. If  you could afford it, 
you had to apply for it and then wait for several years 
before your turn came. Till as late as 1999, there were 
less than 40 million phones in total in the country trans-
lating into just 3.5 phones per 100 individuals. Then, 
after the government launched the New Telecom Policy 
of  1999, mobile phones began to spread like wild fire. 
Entry of  private players, rapidly declining costs due to 
technological advances and tariff-free imports quickly 
turned this luxury into a necessity. At its peak, every 
two months, India was adding 40 million phones. This 
was more than the entire stock of  phones created in 
the first 120 years after the phone was introduced in 
India. Today, there exist 1.2 billion phones in India with 
half  a billion in rural India alone. On average, there are 
nearly three phones per household of  five in rural India 
and six phones per household of  four in urban India.
Bank accounts and mobile phones are two essential 
building blocks of  a payments system that allows indi-
viduals to make money transfers and payments digi-
tally. To turn such bank accounts and mobile phones 
into effective instruments of  these transactions, a plat-
form that intermediates between the payer and payee 
is required. Here too India has been innovative.
1.2.4  Unified Payments Interface:  
A Low-cost Payments System
The National Payments Corporation of  India, a not-
for-profit organization owned by a consortium of  major 
banks and promoted by the Reserve Bank of  India, is 
authorized to operate various retail payment systems in 
the country. The NPCI has developed an instant real-
time payments system to facilitate inter-bank transac-
tions. Known as the Unified Payments Interface (UPI), 
this system allows real-time transfer of  funds between 
two bank accounts on a mobile platform. UPI with-
draws funds from the bank account of  the payer and 
deposits them directly into the payee account.
This is in contrast to a traditional mobile wallet, which 
takes a specified sum of  money from the payer’s bank 
account beforehand and stores it in its own account to 
affect future transactions. Therefore, the transfer of  
funds via these wallets is confined to different users of  
the same wallet. In contrast, the facility to transfer funds 
directly from one bank account to another offered by 
the UPI opens the door to transactions for nearly all 
customers with bank accounts in one of  the 71 banks 
that subscribed to the UPI as of  February 2018.
This is why the decision by WhatsApp to add the 
WhatsApp Pay feature to its platform created a stir in 
the electronic payments market. WhatsApp already 
has 250 million active users, nearly all of  them having 
bank accounts. All users need to do is to link WhatsApp 
Pay to their UPI account, without having to share any 
of  their confidential bank account information. They 
can then seamlessly make transfers to or receive trans-
fers from other WhatsApp Pay users. Interestingly, 
given the large user base of  WhatsApp, NPCI, which 
manages the UPI, did not allow a full-scale launch of  
WhatsApp Pay in one go. Instead, it chose a phased 
rollout to allow the application and bank platforms to 
adjust to the spike in volume.
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1.2.5  Transacting Digitally Through a 
Feature Phone
Access to UPI through apps requires a smart phone. 
While smart phone users are expanding rapidly in 
India, at present they constitute only one-third of  
total mobile phone users. That is to say, two-thirds of  
the mobile users still rely on feature phones. Keeping 
this in view, the NPCI has created another service 
called the Unstructured Supplementary Service Data 
(USSD), which facilitates the use of  the UPI on feature 
phones by dialing a code.
1.2.6  Implications of September 2018 
Aadhaar Ruling by the  
Supreme Court
While India has created an impressive low-cost infra-
structure to facilitate digital transactions, a ruling on 
the use of  Aadhaar identity by the Supreme Court in 
September 2018 has thrown some sand in their way. 
The ruling has gave a green light to the use of  the 
biometric identity by the government in taxation and 
disbursement of  its funds to people. But it has denied 
private sector online access to biometric data for pur-
pose of  verification of  identity. This second part of  
the verdict constitutes a major setback to the use of  
Aadhaar identity by private entities such as commer-
cial banks, mobile service providers and digital wal-
lets. These entities will require an alternative for of  
identification to fulfill Know Your Customer (KYC) 
requirements of  different regulations. The government 
is considering bringing a new legislation, which will 
ensure full data privacy while giving access to identity 
verification facility to private operators upon approval 
by the Aadhaar holder. But until then, the use of  Aad-
haar databases for purposes of  verification of  identity 
has been denied to private entities.
1.2.7  Rapidly Expanding  
Digital Transactions
In the month of  November 2016, when demonetiza-
tion was announced, electronic transactions numbered 
671.5 million. This figure rose to 1.1 billion in Feb-
ruary 2018. This represents a 63.5% jump in just 15 
months. In value terms, electronic transactions rose 
from Rs. 94 trillion ($1.5 trillion) in November 2016 to 
Rs. 115.5 trillion ($1.8 trillion) in February 2018. This 
represents 22.9% increase over the 15-month period. 
Therefore, the growth in the number of  transactions 
has far outstripped the growth in value, implying that 
the strategy of  the government to spread digitization 
among individual customers, who typically engage in 
lower-value transactions, has been successful. Figure 1 
shows the evolution of  the transactions in both num-
ber and value beginning from November 2016, the 
month during which demonetization was announced.
Transactions via UPI protocol have grown far more 
rapidly, although they begin from a low base. In num-
ber, these transactions grew from a tiny 0.3 million in 
November 2016 to 171.4 million in February 2018. In 
value terms, the increase was from 0.9 billion rupees 
to 191 billion rupees. Figure 2 shows the evolution 
in both number and value from November 2016 to 
February 2018.
Figure 1: Evolution of electronic transactions: 
November 2016 to February 2018
Source: Author’s construction using the RBI data from  
http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/content/docs/ 
ELECT07022016_FEB18.xls
The government provides the UPI platform free of  
charge. The only fee paid on transactions taking place 
on this platform is that charged by the banks. In so far 
as competition among banks is likely to keep this charge 
low, transactions on UPI have the potential to eventu-
ally overwhelm those on other platforms. Indeed, given 
that the transactions on credit and debit cards typically 
charge much higher fees, in the long run, their survival 
is a bit doubtful. It is only a matter of  time that mer-
chants will recognize the value of  accepting payments 
via the UPI platform.
240 |"SIPA’s Entrepreneurship & Policy Initiative Working Paper Series  _______________________________________________________
Figure 2: Transactions via UPI protocol:  
November 2016 to February 2018
Source: Author’s construction using the RBI data from  
http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/content/docs/ 
ELECT07022016_FEB18.xls
1.2.8  The Business Correspondent Model: 
Bringing Financial Services to 
Unbanked Areas
While individuals are able to make and receive trans-
fers of  funds using bank accounts and mobiles, they 
also need other banking services. Most notably, indi-
viduals need to be able to carry out cash deposit and 
withdrawal transactions and use their bank accounts 
as instruments of  savings and investment. But this 
requires access to a bank branch, which is often very 
far away from the customer’s village.
To overcome this problem, beginning in 2006, the gov-
ernment has promoted the Business Correspondent 
(BC) model in areas where bank branches do not exist. 
A Business Correspondent is engaged by a bank to pro-
vide banking and financial services in such locations. 
The services may include opening bank accounts; col-
lecting cash for deposit in their personal or beneficiary’s 
account; disbursing small amounts of  loans; recover-
ing installments for loans; and selling bank products 
such as insurance, mutual funds and pension schemes. 
Banks are fully responsible for the acts of  commission 
and omission of  their BCs.
Entities that the RBI allows to serve as BCs include 
Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs); Micro-fi-
nance Institutions (MFIs); post offices; Section 25 com-
panies; retired bank employees, teachers, government 
employees and military personnel; individual owners 
of  kirana, medical and fair Price shops; agents of  
Small Savings schemes of  the Government of  India 
and Insurance Companies; petrol-pump owners; and 
authorized functionaries of  Self  Help Groups (SHGs) 
with links to banks. The RBI advises banks to keep 
charges of  the BC services at levels that are seen as 
reasonable and fair. BCs use mobile, PoS machines 
and micro-ATMs to move funds across bank accounts 
via UPI protocol.
Going by data, the BC model has been highly successful 
in bringing basic banking services to rural areas. The 
spread of  BCs to Indian villages has far outstripped 
the pace of  brick and mortar branch expansion. Fig-
ure 3 provides the total number of  branches and BC 
in rural areas on an annual basis beginning in the end 
of  March 2010 and ending in the end of  March 2017.
Figure 3: Bank branches and Business Correspondents 
in rural India: 2009-10 to 2016-17
Source: author’s construction using the data from RBI Annual Reports
Data on basic savings deposits tells a similar story in 
terms of  absolute number of  transactions though 
not their value. Table 2 reports the key data for years 
2009-10, 2015-16 and 2016-17. Starting at a much 
lower level at the end of  March 2010, the number of  
accounts under the BC model jumped above those at 
the bank branches by the end of  March 2017. But in 
value terms, the deposits with bank branches remained 
significantly higher than those with BCs. This is as one 
would expect given that branches are much larger and 
located in areas with vibrant commercial activity.
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Table 2: Basic Savings Bank Deposits in Branches and 
with Bank Correspondents







Branches 60 238 254
BCs 13 231 280
Total 73 469 533
Value in Rs. Billion
Branches 44 474 691
BCs 11 164 285
Total 55 638 977
While the data shows impressive progress in spread-
ing bank accounts and deposits through the BC 
model, critics have noted that this remains a supply 
driven model. The key evidence supporting this criti-
cism is the presence of  a substantial proportion of  the 
accounts being dormant and virtually no credit activity. 
In addition, the rate of  usage of  active accounts is low. 
Compensation to BCs is poor in relation to the services 
expected of  them. Opportunities for the expansion of  
new bank accounts have also greatly diminished due 
to near saturation under the Jan-Dhan Scheme. Scope 
for earning fees on deposit and withdrawal transac-
tions remains limited.
1.2.9  Payments Banks: Yet Another 
Innovation for Inclusion
To enhance the reach of  digital payments further, the 
Government of  India has introduced payments banks 
launched in August 2015 with the grant of  “in prin-
ciple” licenses to 11 of  the 41 applicants. The recip-
ients of  the license were given 18 months to fulfill all 
requirements after which they could begin operations. 
Bharti Airtel, a telecommunications company, was the 
first to go live as a payments bank in March 2017. Oth-
ers to go live include India Posts and Paytm. A few oth-
ers such as Tech Mahindra and Sun Pharmaceuticals 
surrendered their licenses.
Payments banks are registered as public limited com-
panies under the 2013 Companies Act with a license 
from the RBI. They are not commercial banks, though 
the license from the RBI grants them the permission 
to perform some of  the banking functions including 
remittance services, mobile payments, fund transfers, 
issuance of  ATM, debit card services, net banking ser-
vices and sales of  third-party financial products such as 
insurance and mutual funds. However, payments banks 
are not allowed to advance loans or issue credit cards.
Currently, payments banks are allowed to accept depos-
its up to Rs. 100,000 and can pay interest on them. 
They earn part of  their profit by depositing the funds 
received in banks that pay higher interest than what 
they pay their customers. They also earn profits by 
charging a merchant discount rate (MDR) on transac-
tions undertaken by deposit holders. Other sources of  
revenue may include data monetization, cross-selling of  
financial products, and forming credit access platforms.
For example, Airtel Payments Bank pays 7.25% inter-
est on savings accounts and charges a 0.65% transac-
tion fee. Airtel mobile number of  the deposit holder 
also functions as the account number. The bank has 
launched an app and an online debit card in collabora-
tion with MasterCard that can be used at online mer-
chant portals accepting MasterCard. The bank also 
offers customers a free personal accidental insurance 
cover of  Rs. 100,000 on its savings accounts.
1.3  Changing Landscape of 
Government Transactions
As shown in Table 1, in carrying out its business, the 
government must transact financially with its own min-
istries, states, and local government as well as with busi-
nesses, individuals, and households. Today, technology 
plays a central role in facilitating these transactions. I 
shall briefly touch upon some key components of  this 
technology and associated financial flows.
1.3.1  The Public Finance  
Management System
The government has deployed technology to cut down 
friction in its own payments system. Initially launched 
in 2009 as a system for tracking funds released by the 
central government to states through the erstwhile 
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Planning Commission, the Public Finance Manage-
ment System (PFMS) has evolved into an end-to-end 
solution for processing, tracking, monitoring, account-
ing, reconciliation, and reporting of  financial flows 
into and out of  the central government. It is expected 
to provide a unified platform for tracking releases of  
financial flows and their utilization down to the last 
mile. The plan is to eventually integrate all existing 
stand-alone financial systems to integrate into PFMS. 
These would include all payments of  the Government 
of  India, tax and non-tax receipts, Human Resource 
Management Information Systems, pension systems 
and General Provident Funds.
A major strength of  PFMS is its integration into the 
core banking system. This integration gives the sys-
tem the unique capability to push online payments to 
almost any entity within the banking system including 
state governments, local governments, various agen-
cies implementing myriad government schemes, and 
even individual beneficiaries of  such schemes. PFMS 
already interfaces with core banking systems of  170 
banks including all public sector banks, regional rural 
banks, major private sector banks, RBI, India Post, 
and cooperative banks.5
The benefits of  real-time payments and an accounting 
system cannot be underestimated. First, by allowing 
just-in-time transactions, it cuts the interest cost that 
is otherwise incurred when funds sit unused in tran-
sit. For example, states are the implementing agencies 
for various Centrally Sponsored Schemes. The central 
government may disburse funds for these schemes to 
the states but states may take some time before they 
disburse them to implementing agencies. While these 
funds sit idle with the state governments, the central 
government incurs interest costs on them. A just-in-time 
payments system can ensure that the central govern-
ment has to release funds only when the implementing 
agencies are ready to receive them. Second, the sys-
tem can also eliminate the need for manually balanc-
ing books, thereby minimizing the cost of  accountants. 
Finally, the system also allows tracking and monitoring 
of  projects and can help improve efficiency by provid-
ing real-time data to monitoring agencies.
1.3.2  Direct Benefit Transfers:  
PFMS, Aadhaar and Bank Accounts 
Come Together
In India, the central government sponsors several 
schemes, jointly funded by both itself  and state govern-
ments, involving payments and cash or in-kind transfers 
to individuals or households. A food subsidy program 
under the National Food Security Act, 2013 provides 
wheat and rice at less than 5% of  the market price to 
75% of  the rural and 50% of  the urban population. Cyl-
inders of  liquid petroleum gas (LPG) and kerosene are 
provided for cooking at subsidized prices. Farmers are 
provided fertilizer, especially urea, at subsidized prices. 
The government runs a massive employment guarantee 
program under the National Rural Employment Guar-
antee Act (NREGA), 2005, which entitles one adult in 
every household to 100 days of  employment per year at 
a specified wage. The government also provides schol-
arships to students and pensions to widows.
In each of  these programs, there has been a history of  
ghost beneficiaries and a collection of  benefits multiple 
times by the same individual. There are leakages in the 
system through other channels as well. For example, 
employers under NREGA programs choose to dis-
burse only a part of  the wages due to workers while 
skimming off the rest. Similarly, sellers of  LPG cylin-
ders divert a part of  the supply to commercial LPG 
users who are not entitled to subsidized LPG cylinders.
In recent years, the government has been systematically 
plugging these leakages through the use of  Aadhaar 
verification and direct benefit transfer (DBT). It has 
been able to eliminate millions of  ghost beneficiaries 
as well as multiple collections of  benefits by the same 
beneficiary. Other forms of  leakages have also been 
plugged by depositing the benefit directly to the Aad-
haar seeded bank account of  the beneficiary. For exam-
ple, LPG cylinders are now sold at the market price 
instead of  subsidized prices. Once the seller records the 
sale to a beneficiary in a centralized system, the sub-
sidy is deposited directly to her Aadhaar seeded bank 
account. Similarly, once an employer under NREGA 
files information on a worker having performed work 
in a centralized system, wages are transferred directly 
to her Aadhaar seeded bank account. The approach 
applied to the LPG subsidy is also currently being 
extended to the disbursement of  fertilizer subsidies.
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Estimates of  savings through the elimination of  ghost 
beneficiaries and DBT of  approximately $2.5 to 
$3.3 billion annually over a three-year period have 
appeared in the media. It is difficult to verify the accu-
racy of  these estimates but they seem plausible. It is 
also a reasonable guess that these savings will multiply 
in the years to come as the scope of  DBT expands and 
some of  the in-kind transfers are converted into cash 
transfers, a process that is currently under way.
1.3.3  Government Procurement:  
The Government e-Marketplace
In a new experiment, in August 2016, the government 
launched a Government e-Marketplace (GeM) for its 
procurement of  goods and services in a transparent 
manner. GeM is a paperless and cashless open plat-
form for procurement of  common-use goods and 
services with minimal human interface. Time-bound 
payment to sellers selling on the GeM platform is 
facilitated through integration with PFMS. Effort is 
also under way to integrate GeM with payment sys-
tems of  railways, defense, public sector enterprises, 
and state governments.
The GeM experiment is at present in its infancy. But 
it holds great promise in a country like India where 
multiple layers of  rules and regulations make procure-
ment opaque, costly and time consuming. In princi-
ple, the marketplace can result in speedy procurement 
at competitive prices and hence major savings for the 
government. As an example, tickets for air travel by gov-
ernment employees are currently purchased through 
a monopoly agent. By all accounts, prices charged by 
this agent are exorbitant. Moving the procurement 
of  the tickets to GeM alone can save the government 
millions of  dollars.
1.3.4 E-National Agricultural Market
Traditionally, agricultural markets in India have been 
both opaque and fragmented. Each farmer is required 
to sell her produce in a government-assigned market-
place called a mandi. In mandis, commission agents 
and traders collude to buy the produce at minimal 
prices and then sell to wholesalers and retailers at the 
maximum prices. Prices within and across mandis can 
vary by wide margins.
To introduce competition within and across mandis, in 
April 2016, the government launched the e- National 
Agricultural Market (e-NAM) initiative. Under it, the 
government has already connected 470 mandis across 
14 states electronically. In these markets, the farmer 
can use an electronic platform for auction to sell her 
produce to the highest bidder. Open e-auctions have 
gone some distance towards eliminating dependence 
on commission agents and bringing transparency to 
the sales process and also helped speed up payments to 
farmers. Farmers can bring their produce to the mandi 
in the morning and generally return home in the eve-
ning after auctioning the produce and receiving pay-
ment. Because transactions must be done electronically 
using bank accounts, payments cannot be delayed. In 
the past, they had to often stay overnight and would not 
get payment for one to two weeks. Efforts are currently 
under way to connect another 109 mandis to e-NAM.
1.3.5 Goods and Services Tax Network
Recently, India replaced more than a dozen indirect 
taxes by a single Goods and Services (GST) tax. Use 
of  a technology-based platform called the GST Net-
work or GSTN has been key to the adoption of  this 
tax. Sellers of  goods and services above a threshold are 
required to register on GSTN with a 12-digit identi-
fication number. In March 2018, the total number 
of  such sellers was 10.3 million (6.4 million original 
taxpayers and 3.9 million new registrants). Each seller 
must file a return on a monthly or quarterly basis. The 
return summarizes all information on sales, purchases, 
tax collected on sales, and tax paid on purchases. Tax 
due is calculated as the difference between tax col-
lected on sales and tax paid on purchases. A major 
task of  GSTN is to match buyer and seller invoices to 
ensure that credit being claimed by the buyer matches 
the tax collected from him by the seller.
1.4  Businesses as Providers of 
Fintech Services
Although reference to businesses’ participation in 
fintech has been made in the context of  transactions 
by governments and households, it is important to 
highlight their role here, especially in intermediating 
digital payments.
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1.4.1 Digital Payments
Private-sector players dominate the market in the pro-
vision of  digital payments. The largest player currently 
is Alibaba backed Paytm, which has 300 million regis-
tered users and 7 million offline merchants. It is add-
ing 10 million users each month and accounts for 250 
million transactions per month. Approximately half  of  
these transactions originate in small towns and villages.
In November 2017, Paytm started accepting UPI pay-
ments, which took off immediately. In February 2018, 
its UPI transactions touched 68 million out of  a total of  
171.4 million UPI transactions. Current notable com-
petitors of  Paytm include Mobikwik, Google Tez and 
Flipkart-owned PhonePe and Amazon Pay. The big-
gest disruption is expected to occur when WhatsApp 
Pay fully enters the market.
An important promise of  providers of  digital pay-
ments services is that they can become sources of  
credit for their users. Transactions conducted on their 
platforms provide useful data on payments habits of  
their customers and may be capable of  being lever-
aged for lending activities. If  this turns into reality, 
credit markets for small borrowers would undergo a 
major change in India.
1.4.2  Other Fintech Services by  
Private Businesses
Among other important fintech services provided by pri-
vate businesses, mention may be made of  the following:
• Amazon, Flipkart, Snapdeal, Myntra, BigBasket, 
IndiaMart, Make My Trip, Yatra and Trivago are 
examples of  some major players in e-commerce.
• BankBazaar is a major loan comparison portal 
offering personal loans, home loans, credit cards, 
mutual funds, fixed deposits and savings deposits. 
It also offers health, life and home insurance 
policy comparisons. PolicyBazaar and Apnapaisa 
are the other major players in this space.
• Peer-to-peer lending is in its infancy; nevertheless, 
several sites have emerged. Prominent among 
them are Lendbox, Faircent, I-lend, Easy Rupiya, 
and LenDen Club. Some of  these portals have 
several thousand lenders.
• India has about 15 cryptocurrency exchanges 
of  which four are funded. Bitcoin, Etherium 
and Ripple in that order are the most popular 
crypto currencies in use at these exchanges.6 The 
government has neither endorsed nor banned 
cryptocurrencies. It regularly warns of  risks 
associated with transacting in them, however.
2  Digital Revolution and 
Entrepreneurship
Let us now turn to entrepreneurship in the digital 
technology space. Implicitly, we have already intro-
duced such entrepreneurship when discussing fintech. 
Entrepreneurs operating in fintech are all engaged in 
digital technology entrepreneurship. But we may now 
consider the entrepreneurship aspect of  Digital Revo-
lution more directly.
In the literature on entrepreneurship and digital tech-
nology, a distinction is drawn between digital technol-
ogy entrepreneurship and digital entrepreneurship. 
The former refers to entrepreneurship based on new 
ICT [Information and Communications Technology] 
products such as the iPhone and the latter on prod-
ucts and services based on the Internet. Broadly, the 
former may be thought of  as involving manufacturing 
and the latter creating services using new software and 
existing digital devices and platforms as exemplified by 
WhatsApp.7 In the following, I discuss entrepreneur-
ship of  each kind.
2.1  Digital Technology Entrepreneurship
India has done well in digital-device space at the inno-
vation level. Unfortunately, however, with one major 
exception, it has not done well at translating the inno-
vations into large-scale commercial enterprises. A 
recent paper offers a fascinating discussion of  highly 
cost-effective innovations by Indian entrepreneurs that 
can potentially impact the lives of  the masses, not just 
in India, but worldwide. But in all cases but one, so far, 
this impact has been extremely limited.8
2.1.1 Jio Mobile and Broadband
The most successful low-cost digital technology inno-
vation that has also made a major difference to the 
lives of  the masses is Jio’s Greenfield 4G Long Term 
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Evolution (LTE) network. Because Jio joined the tele-
communications world late, it has no 2G or 3G legacy 
services. Its unique configuration allows Jio to offer 
free voice calls to any network across India. It has no 
national roaming charges, making its network seamless 
throughout the country. The remarkable thing about 
Jio is that it offers 4G Internet to customers at just 10 
cents per gigabyte (GB). Jio’s phone is offered effec-
tively free of  cost to customers.
Jio was launched on September 5, 2016 and within the 
first month, it acquired a record 16 million subscrib-
ers. It crossed the figure of  50 million subscribers in 
83 days and had signed up 100 million subscribers by 
February 22, 2017. By July 5, 2018, Jio had 215 mil-
lion subscribers. This is a feat accomplished in just 22 
months. Competitive pressure brought by Jio has sent 
the prices of  broadband services on mobile phones 
tumbling. The result has been a rapid expansion of  the 
use of  digital technologies in India.
While the innovations underlying Jio have made low-
cost provision of  its services possible, the fact that it is 
owned by one of  the largest conglomerates of  India, 
Reliance Industries Limited (RIL), has been crucial 
to its rapid spread across India. With its deep pockets, 
RIL was able to rapidly scale up the operations of  Jio. 
So far, younger entrepreneurs who are financially less 
capable have had far less success in scaling up their 
digital technology startups even though underlying 
innovations in some cases have been equally cost effec-
tive with potentially large markets. At the same time, it 
needs pointing out that younger Indian entrepreneurs 
in digital as opposed to digital technology space have 
had enormous success in attracting and mobilizing 
investment funds.
2.1.2 iBreastexam
One low-cost digital technology innovation has been 
a device called iBreastExam by young entrepreneur 
Mihir Shah who launched startup UE LifeSciences 
in 2009. The device offers a painless and non-inva-
sive scan, which can detect breast cancer with great 
accuracy at a cost of  just $1. The exam is entirely 
radiation free and can be operated by a community 
health worker. The device has the United States Food 
and Drug Administration clearance and has the CE 
mark required for sales in the European Economic 
Area consisting of  28 countries of  the European 
Union and three countries of  European Free Trade 
Area. The device is currently sold in more than 25 
countries in Africa and Asia. Recently, the New York 
Times published an article extolling its virtues.9 Never-
theless, despite the existence of  a vast potential market 
for the device due to its low cost, ease of  operation, 
and non-invasive nature of  the examination, its sales 
have been relatively limited. The total annual revenues 
remain between one to two million dollars.
2.1.3 Electrocardiogram Sanket
Another similar innovation is a portable matchbox 
size Electrocardiogram (EKG) machine called San-
ket. The device sells for less than $100. It connects 
remotely to a smartphone and records and displays 
EKG on it. The report can be shared instantly with 
a doctor using the smartphone. Sanket has filed for 
multiple patents. Once again, the device has not had 
notable commercial success.
There are several other stories of  devices such as those 
that can detect multiple eye diseases and diagnose mos-
quito-borne diseases at low cost, but they all had dif-
ficulty scaling up. So far, outstanding successes in the 
digital technology space such as that achieved by the 
Jio phone have not emerged in a big way in India.
2.2 Digital Entrepreneurship
The story has been different in digital entrepreneurship 
with several entrepreneurs successfully scaling up their 
operations. In some cases, startups have made inroads 
even in foreign countries. I discuss a handful of  the 
startups in the digital space below. Some of  them have 
appeared earlier in our discussion of  fintech. Never-
theless, it is important to discuss them here to highlight 
their innovation and entrepreneurship aspects.
2.2.1 Flipkart E-commerce Company
The biggest success story in Indian digital entrepre-
neurship space has been Flipkart.10 Two IIT gradu-
ates started it in September 2007 as a website offering 
home delivery of  books. In 2018, Wal-Mart acquired 
it for $16 billion. This is the largest ever acquisition of  
an Indian startup. In 2007, Flipkart made just 20 deliv-
eries in total. The following year, this figure climbed 
up to 3,400 deliveries. In 2009, the startup acquired 
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sufficient visibility to receive a venture capital invest-
ment of  $1 million. It began the year by hiring its first 
employee and ended it with 150 employees. In 2010, 
Flipkart began selling movies and electronic products 
such as video games and mobile phones. The follow-
ing year, the company expanded into selling cameras, 
computers, laptops, large appliances, and stationery. It 
also launched its digital wallet and acquired two digital 
content companies and expanded the delivery network 
to 600 cities.
In 2013, Flipkart adopted a marketplace model and 
brought third-party sellers to its platform. That year, 
it also raised $360 million and the following year, $1.6 
billion. In 2014, it acquired online fashion retailer 
Myntra and majority stakes in after-sales service pro-
vider Jeeves and payments platform Ngpay. By the 
end of  the year, it was valued at $11 billion. In the 
following years, the company made several additional 
acquisitions. By 2016, its mobile app had 50 million 
users and it had 100 million registered customers. In 
2017, Tencent invested $1.4 billion and SoftBank’s 
Vision Fund $1.5 billion in the company. The same 
year, Flipkart also acquired eBay India. By 2018, when 
Wal-Mart acquired it, the company had 130,000 third-
party sellers and was expanding its product catalogue 
to house 80 million products.
2.2.2 Paytm Payments Wallet
As previously mentioned, Paytm (pay through mobile) 
began as a digital wallet in 2010. The founder started 
the company with a $2 million investment of  his own. 
Based on secondary shares sale at the end of  January 
2018, it is now valued at $10 billion. Its operations 
include a payments bank and an e-commerce busi-
ness. Alibaba Group and SoftBank are both investors 
in Paytm.
Paytm wallet allows a user to transfer funds directly 
into a recipient’s account using a QR code or mobile 
number. In May 2018, the company had seven mil-
lion offline merchants spread over India’s 600 districts. 
The first of  these numbers rose from just one million at 
the beginning of  2017. Annualized gross transactions 
value of  the company crossed $20 billion in February. 
This represented a four-fold increase over the previ-
ous year. The number of  transactions using Paytm far 
exceeds the total number of  debit card transactions.11
By August 2018, Paytm had 300 million registered 
users. This figure compares with 520 million Alipay 
users and 237 Paypal users around the same time.12 On 
average, one in five Indians already uses Paytm.
2.2.3 Ola Cab Service
Ola, a cab hailing service, represents another major 
successful Indian startup in digital space. The startup 
was launched in 2010 in competition with the Amer-
ican cab hailing service called Uber. Founded by two 
young entrepreneurs, it operates in more than 110 
Indian cities today. It offers licensed taxis, private 
hire cars and rickshaws and has a network of  approx-
imately one million drivers. The company has been 
valued at $7 billion and has raised approximately $3 
billion in investment funds. Its investors include Soft-
Bank, Tencent, Didi Chuxing and DST Global. In 
January 2018, Ola launched its service in Australia 
and currently operates in seven cities there. At the 
end of  August 2018, it also launched licensed taxi 
and private hire vehicle services in South Wales in the 
United Kingdom.13
2.2.4 Rivigo: A logistics Startup
An especially creative startup, which can make a major 
contribution to transformation of  logistics sector in 
India, is Rivigo.14 Launched in 2014, the startup says 
on its website, “We are transforming logistics in India 
making it human, faster and safer.” Under the conven-
tional trucking model, a single driver drives the truck 
to its final destination hundreds, even thousands, of  
miles away with multiple stops on the way to catch up 
on sleep. Stops on the way cause delays in reaching the 
destination and the driver remains separated from his 
family for days, sometimes weeks. Temptation to keep 
driving the truck for long hours to complete the task 
sooner can also lead to fatigue and result in accidents.
To overcome these problems, Rivigo has invented what 
it calls a “relay” model of  truck transportation whereby 
a driver drives the vehicle for four or five hours and, at 
a designated pit stop, meets another driver driving a 
truck in the opposite direction. The drivers exchange 
the trucks with each other at the pit stop and drive back 
to where they came from. Upon returning to a home pit 
stop, each driver hands over his truck to another driver 
who carries it to the next pit stop. This “relay” driving 
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of  trucks keeps trucks moving continuously while also 
allowing each driver to return to his home the same 
day to be with his family. The model has allowed the 
startup to substantially reduce the time a truck takes to 
reach its destination while also saving the drivers from 
having to spend long periods away from family. With 
more humane trucking jobs, the startup is also able to 
recruit drivers with greater ease.
In four years, by March 2018, Rivigo had a fleet of  
3,000 trucks. The company has created a network of  
70 pit stops nationwide. Each driver drives about 250 
kilometers, or five hours, between pit stops. Simulta-
neous movement of  a large number of  trucks in many 
directions requires solving a complex programming 
problem. A sophisticated algorithm does routing and 
assignment of  drivers. Whenever one or more trucks 
break down, the algorithm re-optimizes and rejigs the 
assignments. Each driver carries a mobile app, which 
provides necessary instructions in real time.
Rivigo also deploys sophisticated technology to mon-
itor pilferage of  gasoline and refrigeration of  perish-
ables it transports. During it years of  operation, it has 
collected vast volume of  data, which it is beginning to 
use to deploy Artificial Intelligence. In 2017, the com-
pany raised $50 million and was valued at $1 billion.
2.2.5 OYO Hospitality Company
Started in 2013 by an 18-year old entrepreneur, OYO 
(“on your own”) is a hospitality company offering bud-
get hotel rooms. The startup partners with hotels to 
give guests a similar experience in terms of  certain 
basic amenities across the nation at highly competi-
tive prices. In January 2013, the startup had just one 
hotel with which it partnered. That number rose to 
thirteen in July 2014 and rapidly climbed up to more 
than 8500 by September 2018. In 2018, OYO offered 
hotel rooms in 230 Indian cities. It has also expanded 
its operations abroad in Malaysia, Nepal and China. 
In 2017, the startup raised $260 million with SoftBank 
being the largest funder. Although the current valua-
tion of  OYO is placed at $1 billion, it has so far been 
running in substantial losses and its business model has 
been questioned.15
2.3 Startup India
In 2015, the Government of  India announced its 
Startup India initiative. Under it, the government cre-
ated a simplified set of  rules for enterprises qualifying 
as startups. It also created a fund of  100 billion rupees 
to provide financing for startups.
Startup India defines a startup as an enterprise that 
is less than seven years old and has a turnover of  less 
than 250 million rupees. Under the Insolvency and 
Bankruptcy Code, a startup can exit in 90 days. It can 
comply with laws through self-certification and is free 
from inspections for the first three years of  operation. 
It is also exempt from capital gains and other taxes in 
the first three years. As a part of  Startup India initia-
tive, the government also launched the Atal Innovation 
Mission, which offers funding for incubators and Atal 
Innovation Labs in schools.
3 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have analyzed the manner in which 
the Digital Revolution has progressed in India in two 
areas: fintech and entrepreneurship. In discussing fin-
tech, I have described the key changes that digital tech-
nology is bringing to transactions taking place among 
the government, individuals and businesses. The focus 
of  this discussion has been on inclusion and develop-
ment aspects of  the change spawned by digitalization. 
The government has played a very active role in driv-
ing the change in this area in India.
The key to the ongoing change in fintech, which has 
a considerable distance to go in India, is a biometric 
identity known as Aadhaar. Nearly every financial 
transaction requires definitive proof  of  identity of  the 
transacting parties. Aadhaar provides this proof  with-
out any document via biometric verification. This is a 
major asset the country now has. Though there remain 
some legal issues related to date privacy to be resolved, 
with the matter under consideration by the Supreme 
Court, the government and businesses are already 
using this asset effectively in creative ways.
Regarding entrepreneurship in the digital space, a 
distinction can be drawn between digital technology 
entrepreneurship and digital entrepreneurship. The 
former typically involves invention of  devices that ful-
fill one or more needs while the latter relies principally 
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on new software, which is used on existing devices 
and digital platforms. I have shown that India has 
had limited success at best in digital technology entre-
preneurship. Though startups have innovated highly 
cost-effective devices, they have not been able to turn 
them into major commercial successes. This outcome 
mirrors India’s generally limited success in the manu-
facturing sector. The story in the digital space has been 
a happier one with a large number of  startups success-
fully scaling up and even taking their innovations to 
foreign markets.
Four final points must be made. First, no technology 
can substitute for growth in so far as inclusion is con-
cerned. In the end, the real empowerment comes from 
having command over financial resources, and that 
command comes from income. Indeed, without access 
to income, even the spread of  financial technology 
risks remaining a supply side phenomenon. Whether 
or not individuals and households use the supplied 
technologies critically depends on their incomes. As 
an example, though the government and banks have 
been able to proliferate business correspondents, 
the use of  their services has remained limited sim-
ply because incomes and commercial activity in the 
smaller villages are limited.
My second point is that mere availability of  technology 
will not lead individuals to adopt it. Incentives matter. 
As an example, if  tax rates are high, parties involved 
in a transaction have an incentive to use cash to make 
payments and not risk creating a digital record of  the 
transaction by making or receiving payment digitally. 
This is particularly true of  small businesses. Likewise, 
if  tax enforcement authorities have a history of  harass-
ing taxpayers, small businesses would try to remain out 
of  the tax system. Once again, they would prefer to 
transact in cash as long as possible.
My third point is that it is important not to fall into the 
trap of  turning technology into an enemy of  good pol-
icies. Momentum for the removal of  policies that are 
popular but nevertheless promote inefficiency comes 
from poor implementation of  those policies. Large 
leakages and poor targeting of  subsidies can provide 
critics much needed ammunition to advocate for 
their removal. To the extent that technology becomes 
the means to effective implementation of  these anti-
growth policies, it turns into an enemy of  reform. In 
such circumstances, the task of  convincing the policy 
makers that what is needed is not effective implemen-
tation of  the poorly thought out policy, but its removal, 
becomes yet more difficult for economists.
Finally, India needs to keep a level playing field between 
domestic and foreign investors in the digital space. 
While India must take all necessary steps to ensure 
cyber security, it must resist calls for restrictions on for-
eign investors to promote domestic entrepreneurs. Such 
restrictions harm the consumer by denying her the best 
service. They also exert negative influence on produc-
tivity by blocking the entry of  enterprises employing 
the latest innovations. Indeed, to the extent that most 
successful domestic startups in the digital space them-
selves achieve high valuations after foreign investors 
make sizeable investments in them, tilting the playing 
field in favor of  domestic investors is self-defeating. 
In such situations, they will have to opt out of  foreign 
investment to avail the benefits of  being considered as 
domestic enterprises. It is important to remember that 
for many years to come, foreign venture capital, angel 
investment, and private equity will remain critical to 
the growth of  startups in India.
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By Accident or Design? Shenzhen as a Global Hub  
for Digital Entrepreneurs
by Kirsten LundbergI
NOTE: This case history was written as the basis for scholarly discussion and discourse. It does not advance policy recommendations. 
It is a history of  Shenzhen’s evolution and raises such questions as: Can Shenzhen’s example be duplicated? If  so, how? How much of  
Shenzhen’s success derived from its proximity to Hong Kong? How much from being a greenfield development site? Did the absence of  
established state-owned enterprises contribute meaningfully to the city government’s willingness to assist private-sector players? In general, 
did Shenzhen’s municipal government lead or follow? Can government legislate innovation? Other questions undoubtedly will occur to 
readers; it is our hope this work and those questions become the catalyst for further research. 
By 2019, the south China coastal city of  Shenzhen 
was recognized worldwide as a digital technology 
powerhouse. The media branded it a second Silicon 
Valley. Shenzhen annually registered record numbers 
of  patents under the international Patent Coopera-
tion Treaty. Incubators and accelerators supported 
an exploding number of  start-ups in such diverse 
fields as medical devices, new materials, robotics, and 
artificial intelligence.
In its early years, from 1981–93, the city’s GDP grew 
at an astonishing average 40 percent a year; that rate 
slowed to a still-impressive 16.3 percent for 2001–05 
before settling at annual growth of  10 percent or 
less. In 2017, GDP hit CN¥2.2 trillion ($338 billion), 
higher than countries like Portugal or Ireland and 
double its 2011 output.1 Shenzhen became headquar-
ters to multiple billion-dollar companies, and to 65 
percent of  global smartphone brands. With 90 per-
cent of  its companies in private hands, Shenzhen held 
pride of  place as China’s capital of  private industry. 
Investment money poured into what had become 
China’s wealthiest city.
Yet barely 40 years earlier, Shenzhen had been a back-
ward area of  fields, rice paddies, and fishing villages. 
How had China pulled off the seemingly impossible 
feat of  building a world-class city in the blink of  an 
eye? What accounted for its outsize expertise in digital 
technology? Why did entrepreneurs from China and 
abroad flock to live there? More specifically, how did 
government and public policies contribute to its status 
as a global mecca for digital entrepreneurs? Was Shen-
zhen a one-off, or might any government, through 
careful planning, create such a phenomenon?
A close look at Shenzhen’s policy history could hold 
clues to the answers. Undoubtedly, a young and 
risk-taking population, lured by ambition to Chi-
na’s first Special Economic Zone (SEZ), deserves 
chief  credit for the city’s success. But especially in 
the early years, municipal leaders took advantage of  
the unusual latitude offered by SEZ status to experi-
ment. City leaders moved early, fast, and far to devise 
the country’s first land sale, first labor contract, first 
stock exchange. They were willing to risk failure—
and embraced what worked by embedding successful 
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industries and strategies in municipal Five-Year Plans 
and other public policies. Their goal: make Shen-
zhen as attractive a place as possible to work, invest, 
and live.
Accounts differ on just when Shenzhen decided to bill 
itself  as a center for high-technology manufacturing. 
Some say from its creation; others date it to 1992, or 
1996. Regardless, Shenzhen by the early 21st century 
had become the world’s electronics factory, turning out 
90 percent of  global production. At first, these goods 
copied others’ designs. But with the advent of  cell-
phones, copycats morphed into inventors—local engi-
neers created better phones that cost less.
Seemingly overnight, Shenzhen companies tran-
sitioned from filling orders for others to designing, 
making, and profiting from their own groundbreaking 
inventions. Instead of  cheap copies, the city by 2010 
had earned a reputation for quality originals. The 
pragmatic city government moved to capitalize on 
the astonishing success of  local business. It saw its job 
as building an innovation-friendly ecosystem that 
would maintain Shenzhen’s position at the forefront 
of  digital creativity.
Among numerous incentives to lure skilled profession-
als, Shenzhen offered cash bonuses to Nobel laure-
ates who chose to relocate there. It funded dozens of  
incubators for inventors. It strengthened legal protec-
tion for intellectual property. It created a municipal 
investment fund that took cash positions in promising 
start-ups, both in China and abroad. It gave academic 
institutions incentives to open local branches. It built 
laboratories and expanded tax-free zones. It enhanced 
social services and cultural attractions.
Whether this would prove enough was an open ques-
tion. Competition was fierce domestically and inter-
nationally. Building spaces for innovation did not 
guarantee inventions would result. The Chinese econ-
omy after 2015 slowed from the red-hot growth of  ear-
lier decades. Trade tensions with the U.S. and others 
threatened its export-led economic model. President 
Xi Jinping had reasserted political control, and observ-
ers debated the sincerity of  his support for a free mar-
ket. Shenzhen was a good place to live and work, but it 
wasn’t Paris or Singapore or San Francisco. What pol-
icy tools might local government use to keep Shenzhen 
a digital technology leader?
Shenzhen—Pioneer
China’s central government created the city of  Shen-
zhen in 1979 as an economic experiment.2 Communist 
Party Chairman Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution 
and Great Leap Forward had left the country impov-
erished and backward. After Mao’s death in 1976, 
reformer Deng Xiaoping prevailed as China’s preemi-
nent leader. In December 1978, the Communist Party 
Central Committee (CCCP) officially adopted his 
Reform and Opening, or Open Door, policy.
Aiming to provide jobs and build prosperity, Deng 
advocated what he called “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics,” a gradual transition from a command 
to a market-based economy. “The point of  reform,” 
wrote Shenzhen resident and expert Mary Ann 
O’Donnell, “was not to flip flop from collectivism to 
capitalism, but to use aspects of  capitalism to achieve 
socialist goals.”3
In 1979, the CCCP designated four cities in the 
southern Guangdong and Fujian provinces as Special 
Economic Zones (SEZ), and authorized them to try 
a variety of  market mechanisms in order to demon-
strate what could work in China.4 All four locations 
were deliberately far from Beijing—perhaps to reduce 
temptation for the central government to meddle, or to 
easily conceal mistakes—and close to prosperous cen-
ters like Macau or Taiwan.
From the start, the central government granted the 
new SEZs unprecedented self-government privileges. 
In a country accustomed to central control of  every-
thing from factory output to social policies, these local 
governments were given flexibility to develop their 
own policies on foreign trade, foreign exchange, and 
economic development. They could set their own 
policies on city planning, pricing, wages, business 
management, and the economic activities of  foreign 
individuals and enterprises.5 As Professor Li Jinkui, a 
senior research fellow at Shenzhen’s China Develop-
ment Institute (CDI), puts it:
The central government gave them an abstract 
experimental zone of  Opening and Reform, 
where it was left up to them to decide what to do, 
and to experiment. Once the work was done and 
the achievements reached, the central government 
would subsequently endorse their actions as correct.6
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Finally, Beijing granted legal entities and individuals 
permission to create private companies in the SEZs. 
In China at the time, capitalism was a dirty word, and 
any enterprise with more than eight employees was 
a “capitalistic establishment” liable to prosecution. 
The SEZs had an extraordinary license to improvise.
SSEZ. On August 26, 1980, the government desig-
nated 327 (later 396) square kilometers of  southern 
Guangdong as the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone 
(SSEZ).7 Bao’an County, as the area was known, was 
a neglected region of  agricultural villages, lychee 
orchards, and rice paddies, with a 1979 GDP of  
CN¥196 million (US$30 million).8 The county market 
town, Shenzhen, had a population of  barely 30,000.
Shenzhen had a unique geographic advantage: close 
proximity to Hong Kong, then a British colony and a 
global financial center. Over the years since the 1949 
founding of  the People’s Republic of  China, hundreds 
of  thousands of  ethnic Chinese had fled the main-
land across a bay to Hong Kong.9 Beijing hoped some 
of  those expatriates would see promising investment 
opportunities in the new SEZ.
The vision was ambitious. The central government 
rejected the city’s first proposed “master layout 
plan” of  August 1980 as too modest; it wanted to 
see a large industrial city. The SSEZ was to be “a 
‘window’ for observing global trends in economic, 
technological and scientific development; an ‘experi-
mental ground’ of  reforms; and a ‘school’ for human 
resources training.”10
In 1981, Beijing gave Shenzhen the same administra-
tive status as the provincial capital, Guangzhou. That 
meant city leaders reported directly to Beijing, and the 
central government appointed both Shenzhen’s mayor 
and its Communist Party secretary. Wayne Huang, 
founding dean of  the SUSTech Business School, notes 
that “everyone knows if  he is chosen to be the mayor 
or party secretary to lead this city, they have a great 
future. But they have to show some solid KPIs, key per-
formance indicators, or they won’t be promoted. So 
they are very motivated.”11
First City Government
The officials assigned to run Shenzhen’s early govern-
ment came from multiple jurisdictions; they owed their 
appointments to stellar credentials as revolutionaries, 
and a demonstrated loyalty to Deng. Circumstances 
obliged them to be innovators. As one-time Shenzhen 
Vice Mayor Ming Li points out, officials were expected 
to find their own way. “The central government gave 
policies, but no funds,” he says.12
Government officials working here, me included, 
do not ask the provincial or central government for 
funds when faced with difficulties in local develop-
ment. Instead, we try to find solutions via the mar-
ket and global cooperation.
Their assignment was to open China to outside investors 
and build a market economy. In 1981, Liang Xiang was 
named Shenzhen’s first party secretary and mayor. He 
joined Yuan Geng, already in place as vice chair of  China 
Merchants Group (Hong Kong). In 1983, Luo Zhengqi 
arrived as first president of  the newly created Shenzhen 
University. The trio, wrote scholar O’Donnell, were 
“willing to take responsibility for actions they believed to 
be correct, even if  those actions were unapproved out-
side or within Shenzhen’s borders at the time.”13
In a country where the government had long assigned 
citizens housing and jobs, Shenzhen created the nation’s 
first property and labor markets. In August 1984, the 
city allowed employers to hire workers for a set time 
period, adjust salaries to match performance, or fire bad 
workers.14 In November 1984, the city abolished vouch-
ers for food, clothing, and other necessities, replaced by 
a cash market. In June 1988, a comprehensive housing 
reform ended government distribution of  housing and 
allowed individuals to rent or purchase housing.15
Land auctions. City government had to find a way to 
build residential, commercial, and industrial areas. 
To locals’ surprise, foreigners—even in Hong Kong—
at first took little interest in investing in Shenzhen. 
Instead, Chinese ministries and departments (even-
tually 24) took advantage of  tax exemptions and free 
land to build the city’s first enterprises.16 Ironically, the 
city gave so much land for free to ministries that land 
scarcity became an enduring problem.17 But the fac-
tories generated enough revenue to start building the 
city’s infrastructure: electrical lines, water mains, roads.
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Then in 1984, Beijing designated an additional 14 
coastal cities “open,” creating internal competition 
for resources. In 1985, to curb a construction boom in 
many parts of  China, the central government imposed 
stringent fiscal and credit constraints. Shenzhen saw 
capital construction investment plunge from CN¥2.8 
billion in 1985 to CN¥1.9 billion in 1986.18 The lesson 
was clear: Shenzhen could not rely on government. It 
would have to find other ways to generate revenue.
Luo Jinxing, vice director general of  the Shenzhen 
Housing Authority, saw a way to bring the city the 
money it needed. He created a Special Economic 
Zone Real Estate Company to partner in China’s first 
joint ventures with Hong Kong investors.19 In Decem-
ber 1987, Shenzhen auctioned off “use rights” for a 
93,000-square foot parcel.20 One of  Luo’s joint ventures 
bought the parcel for CN¥5.25 million ($1.42 million).
It was the city’s first revenue from a land auction. As 
former Vice Mayor Ming Li puts it: “The first bucket 
of  gold in Shenzhen was earned from land auctions 
. . . . The government took the money from auctions 
to construct the urban infrastructure, such as roads, or 
plumbing networks.” Such experiences led Shenzhen’s 
leaders to become, says Ming Li, “innovative problem 
solver[s]. Instead of  asking others for monetary sup-
port, we have had to find our own solutions to prob-
lems. Self-reliance has become a habit.” Before long, 
it identified other funding sources: in 1989, the city’s 
Second Master Plan explicitly called for more exports 
and more foreign investment.21
Flocking to Opportunity
That kind of  city proved a magnet for China’s most 
ambitious young people. Millions, including military 
brigades sent by Beijing, came to build the city—
construction workers, plumbers, electricians. “From 
one year to the next, there were cranes everywhere,” 
reported an observer. “The whole place was a con-
struction site.”22
Other immigrants were young professionals trapped 
in dead-end jobs, mired in poverty, or unhappy in 
good jobs. “If  a young man has neither political nor 
academic advantages, and the only thing he has to 
offer is hard work, then Shenzhen is the place where 
he has the biggest shot,” says CDI’s Li, who him-
self  arrived in 1989. SUSTech Dean Wayne Huang 
concurs: “You don’t need connections. You create 
your own connections. That appeals very well to 
risk-taking, ambitious young people.” Entrepreneur 
Su Ming mentions another attraction: “You can make 
money here.”
In 1984, Deng made a ceremonial inspection tour of  
three SEZs, including Shenzhen. He was curious to 
see it, but he also wanted to undercut the city’s critics 
in Beijing. During the tour, he commented repeatedly 
on Shenzhen’s progress and voiced his approval of  its 
reforms. At the end, he pronounced that “the develop-
ment and experiences of  Shenzhen have proved the 
correctness of  our policy on the establishment of  spe-
cial economic zones.”23 The following year he added 
that “the open policy will not be changed. If  changed, 
it will only become more open. Without the open pol-
icy, there is no hope for” China’s modernization.24
Nonetheless, in 1985 authorities created a division 
between the SEZ proper and greater Shenzhen. To 
control migration, the government completed con-
struction of  an internal border called the Second 
Line (the First Line was the border with Hong Kong). 
Almost as well guarded as an international border, 
sentries manned 163 watchtowers along a 90-kilmeter 
patrol road. To enter the SEZ, migrants had to obtain 
a Boundary Region Pass, granted only after providing 
proof  of  employment, political affiliation, an invitation 
from within the SEZ, and a fee payment.25
Even with that added obstacle, the population 
exploded. The Shenzhen Planning Bureau in 1981 
predicted that the SEZ population would reach 
400,000 in 1990 and 1 million by 2000. The region 
hit every milestone early. From 310,000 in 1979, the 
population reached nearly a million in 1986, 1.5 mil-
lion (4.49 million in greater Shenzhen) by 1995, and 
3.19 million (8.46 million) in 2006.26
It made for a strange mix, with non-locals far out-
numbering locals. “It is those who have ambitions to 
achieve a career and personal development that have 
made it here from all over China,” says former Vice 
Mayor Li Ming, who arrived in Shenzhen in 1992. 
“Non-locals make up more than 90 percent of  Shen-
zhen’s population.” The city’s predominant language 
became Mandarin, not Cantonese as in the rest 
of  Guangdong.
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Hukou. But the flood of  blue- and white-collar workers 
caused a host of  problems. One of  the thorniest was 
the hukou, or residence permit. Across China, access 
to social services including education and housing 
required a hukou. In large, desirable cities, these were 
nearly impossible to obtain. As a result, moving from 
one city to another was rare.
Shenzhen, faced with millions of  workers with no right 
to housing, had to improvise. In 1984, the authori-
ties allowed migrants without a hukou but with a job 
to register as temporary workers.27 Nonetheless, some 
workers found only seasonal or temporary jobs—and 
remained unregistered. In general, unregistered work-
ers earned less, had no access to subsidized healthcare 
or education, and had to pay hefty fees for their chil-
dren to attend school.28
Housing. To house them, the city built as fast as it could. 
The term “Shenzhen speed” was coined when city 
construction firms in the 1980s succeeded in putting 
up skyscrapers at an average 2½ floors per day. As the 
city grew, millions who could not afford market rent 
lived in huge, subsidized corporate dormitories. As one 
academic put it, Shenzhen’s “growth was propelled by 
a purposeful push from a powerful state. Its boom was 
sustained by the extended implementation of  favorable 
policies and rapid and continued build-up of  large-
scale, state-financed infrastructure.”29 The city also 
granted property ownership rights to villages inside 
the SEZ—and enterprising villagers rushed to profit 
from the newly created real estate market. Before long, 
the encroaching city swallowed what became known as 
“urban villages.”
An Economy Rises
In the midst of  this frenzied building boom, an econ-
omy grew in Shenzhen. Its core was manufacturing, 
most of  it labor-intensive, low-technology assembly of  
household electronics like telephones and calculators. 
Production costs in Shenzhen (as in China generally) 
were significantly lower than in developed economies. 
While their quality was often shoddy, Shenzhen prod-
ucts satisfied millions of  consumers both in China 
and abroad. The city also developed a sophisticated 
shipping industry.
As the city had hoped, Hong Kong businessmen soon 
saw the virtue of  building factories in Shenzhen. The 
city’s foreign direct investment (FDI) rose from CN¥30 
million ($17 million) in 1981 to CN¥2.49 billion ($720 
million) in 1986.30 To further attract foreign inves-
tors and business owners, Shenzhen in 1987 created 
an Office of  Foreign Investment Promotion to plan, 
approve, manage, and provide services for foreign-
ers.31 The same year, it opened the Shatoujiao Bonded 
Industrial Area to attract more FDI.
The city realized that to flourish, its local enterprises 
needed financial services, starting with banking. In 
1982, it admitted the first foreign bank to China (the 
Hong Kong-based Nanyang Commercial Bank).32 
On July 8, 1983, the Joint Investment Corporation of  
Bao’an County issued the country’s first stock. In 1985, 
the city opened a foreign exchange center, followed in 
May 1988 by the Shenzhen Foreign Exchange Trading 
Center, which ended the country’s longstanding ban 
on trading currencies.33 It established the first capital 
goods market and futures exchange in China. In 1986, 
it was the first city to privatize a state-owned enterprise 
(SOE).34 In 1987, the China Merchants Bank became 
the first joint stock commercial bank on the mainland. 
The Shenzhen SEZ Securities Corporation was Chi-
na’s first securities firm.
Shenzhen’s GDP rose from CN¥196 million in 1979 
to CN¥13 billion in 1986 at an annual rate most years 
of  30+ percent.35 By 1989, Shenzhen was well on its 
way to becoming a thriving metropolis of  small man-
ufacturers. But the entire development model it repre-
sented was about to come under intense attack.
Threat and Recovery
From April 15 to June 4, 1989, a million student-led 
Chinese protestors gathered in Tiananmen Square in 
Beijing to call for greater democracy, freedom of  the 
press, and freedom of  speech. The students were no 
fans of  untrammeled capitalism, either; they protested 
equally against the kind of  social and financial inequal-
ity they saw emerging in Shenzhen. The government 
took a while to decide how to respond, but once it did, 
the results were bloody. At least 300 died; thousands 
were arrested.36
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In the wake of  Tiananmen, ideological opponents 
of  SEZs gained influence nationally.37 To Party con-
servatives opposed to market liberalization, cities like 
Shenzhen were an affront, veering far too close to cap-
italism.38 These critics also pointed to the 1989 fall of  
the Berlin Wall and subsequent collapse of  the Soviet 
Union as a cautionary tale of  what happened when a 
state loosened economic and political controls.39 The 
critique had a chilling effect on commerce: by 1990, 
many foreign investors had fled China and its growth 
rate fell to one-third that of  recent years.40
Many leading Beijing officials called Shenzhen a mis-
take. What city leaders saw as flexibility and experi-
mentation, SEZ critics decried as lawlessness and 
chaos. “The perception at that time was [Shenzhen] 
was very corrupt,” says Dean Huang, that “with money 
you could buy everything.” Shenzhen had also skirted 
a national law that required employers to give permis-
sion for employees to transfer to new jobs. “Shenzhen 
at that time had a policy that said even if  you don’t have 
an official stamp agreement, we accept you,” recounts 
Huang. Provincial governors nationwide complained 
to Beijing. “They wanted the central government to 
punish the Shenzhen city government,” says Huang.
City leaders were unsure how Beijing would react 
post-Tiananmen. They prepared two action options: 
resign or stay the course. For months, Shenzhen gov-
ernment officials, entrepreneurs and financiers waited 
anxiously to see whether they would be allowed to 
continue their economic experiment. Meanwhile, the 
city government further improved business conditions. 
In December 1990, it established the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange—another first.41 It also permitted former 
SOEs to go public.
Exonerated. Finally, in January 1992, Deng made another 
southern tour, a follow-up to his famous 1984 trip. He 
had stepped down from his government and Party 
positions, but his words still carried great weight with 
policymakers. In Shenzhen, Deng made the case for a 
socialist market economy. “If  China does not practice 
socialism, does not carry on with ‘reform and opening’ 
and economic development, does not improve the peo-
ple’s standard of  living, then no matter what direction 
we do, it will be a dead end,” he said.42 He urged the 
city not to “act as women with bound feet”; in other 
words, to move boldly.43
Deng’s visit produced immediate benefits: the Stand-
ing Committee of  the National People’s Congress 
later in 1992 granted the Shenzhen Municipal Peo-
ple’s Congress (city legislature) and its Standing Com-
mittee the power to pass its own laws, including setting 
its own tax rate and structure. Only the national and 
provincial People’s Congresses had such legislative 
authority. The city in rapid succession adopted a min-
imum wage and social insurance package (pension, 
medical, housing), expanded privatization, and imple-
mented governance reforms for SOEs.44 Shenzhen’s 
1993 FDI rose to US$497 million from $250 million 
a year earlier.45
Indirectly, Tiananmen benefited Shenzhen. Many 
of  those disillusioned by or caught up in Tiananmen 
sought new opportunities in the experimental city to the 
south. “In Shenzhen, whatever you do, nobody judges 
or interferes,” notes CDI’s Li, who himself  moved to 
the city in the wake of  Tiananmen. His CDI colleague 
Nan Jie agrees. A lawyer, she also moved to Shenzhen 
after 1989, and found that “everything felt fresh, as if  
everything had just begun from zero.”46 She adds:
Shenzhen is the Chinese city that agrees the most 
with international rules and values. That is the big-
gest difference. Here they don’t care about whether 
you are a capitalist, Communist, or socialist. They 
only prioritize efficiency, global collaboration, and 
global rules. Politics is not the priority.
Moving Toward High-tech
Reenergized Shenzhen government officials realized 
they could not rest on their laurels. As competition 
grew within China as well as from other Asian coun-
tries, low-cost manufacturing was no longer a reli-
able economic engine. The high-technology industry 
seemed to offer promise. As early as 1982, in its first 
Outline Plan for Social Economic Development, the 
city government had called for a focus on high-tech—
which at the time meant consumer electronics—and 
capital-intensive enterprises.47
Shenzhen had even made a stab at cornering the Chi-
nese electronics market when, in 1986, the national 
Ministry of  Electronics teamed with the city govern-
ment to establish the Shenzhen Electronics Group 
Company, a state effort to operate China’s first elec-
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tronics parts supply market. The ministry contributed 
experts while the city gave land and tax exemptions. 
The business focused on small, consumer electron-
ics like televisions which could be easily copied from 
existing models.
But the state-operated enterprises failed. So the city 
government took a pragmatic decision: get out of  
electronics, and let private enterprise take over. “If  it 
was unable to lead the development of  this industry 
itself, why not let market forces do the work instead?” 
summarizes Michael Hou, chair of  research for a 
Shenzhen futures brokerage.48 There were candidates 
already in place, although no one could have predicted 
their future course. In 1987, entrepreneur Ren Zheng-
fei established a small company he called Huawei to 
import phone switches from Hong Kong and reverse 
engineer them. “The government,” says Hou, “kept its 
hands out of  equity rights and investments in private, 
high-tech businesses, allowing them to operate enter-
prises on their own terms.” The following year the 
Taiwan-based electronics firm, Foxconn Technology 
Group, opened a factory in Shenzhen.
As of  1991, Shenzhen’s output in high-tech was valued 
at a modest $340 million.49 Some wanted to change 
that. One of  them was Zhou Luming, who in early 
1992 moved from a university job in Wuhan to work in 
the Law and Regulation Office of  Shenzhen’s Depart-
ment of  Science and Technology. A year later, he 
was director. He moved because he realized that “all 
these academic articles we were writing were unable 
to resolve real problems,” and he hoped for better in 
Shenzhen.50 But on arrival, he was “extremely disap-
pointed, because there were no systematic incentives 
[to attract] innovative talent before 1992. Everyone 
was still gaming the stock market and real estate mar-
ket, or just doing conventional trading.”
Then in August 1992, public protests shook the 
Shenzhen government. Some 700,000 frustrated 
would-be investors rioted because shares for a new 
issue on the Shenzhen stock market were insufficient 
to meet demand. The protesters were sure that cor-
ruption among officials at the People’s Bank of  China 
lay behind the snafu.51 The stock exchange crisis, 
says Zhou, coincided with declines in Shenzhen’s 
real estate, trade, and manufacturing sectors. The 
protestors “had quite a scandalous conflict with the 
police,” he recalls, but protest “was a key catalyst to 
force Shenzhen to switch from its traditional focus 
on stocks, real estate, and trade to the innovative 
high-tech sector.”
From where he sat in the five-person Law and Regu-
lation Office, Zhou could see for himself  just how far 
Shenzhen still had to go to encourage high-tech. One 
of  his assignments was to design a system for valuing 
intangible assets—an essential tool for any technology 
company that relied on knowledge and ideas. “It was 
unimaginable before 1992 in China that technology 
knowledge could constitute valid capital, a basis for 
investing in a company,” he says.
To his satisfaction, Shenzhen became “the first to intro-
duce a policy that allowed investing in a company with 
technology as its capital.” Even then, the national 1993 
Companies Law limited investment in intangible assets 
to 35 percent, forcing nascent technology firms need-
lessly to acquire real estate and other real property in 
order to reduce the percentage of  their most valuable 
asset—knowledge. In Shenzhen, that limit was quickly 
lifted to 90 percent.52
Policy shift. In May 1993, the city formally announced 
a new focus on high tech, specifically software, tele-
communications, microelectronics, optical-electro-me-
chanical integration, and new materials.53 The city’s 
9th Five-Year Plan (1996–2000) called for it to become 
a “world class city.”54 In 1996, it further advanced high-
tech enterprises by creating the Shenzhen High-Tech 
Industrial Park (SHIP).
The government published plans, but in practice 
Shenzhen policy followed where companies led. “The 
decision to make the shift has always been made by the 
enterprises themselves, not the government,” empha-
sizes Zhou. “The innovative mindset always originated 
within enterprises.” Research conducted by lawyer 
Nan Jie (CDI) found that in fact the largest Shenzhen 
companies “did not get even one penny from the gov-
ernment during their founding days, which was totally 
the opposite of  our expectation. I do not think gov-
ernment policies played a role in pushing the advance-
ment of  these enterprises.”
Shenzhen expert Mary Ann O’Donnell agrees. “It’s 
not that [government] said, let’s do IT,” she notes.55 
Instead, it adopted an “own it if  it works” mentality. 
“You see it all the time in Shenzhen’s history: some-
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thing gets tried, and they see if  it works. If  it works, you 
formalize it. And if  it doesn’t work, you forget about it. 
You pretend it never happened,” she adds.
Others concur. Risk analyst-turned-researcher Hou 
points out that “the massive electronics and digital 
industry around Shenzhen, which created a mature 
supply chain, laid the foundation for developing a 
high-tech industry.” David Li, a Shenzhen veteran who 
in 2015 founded the Shenzhen Open Innovation Lab 
technology incubator, adds that “the Chinese govern-
ment doesn’t gather round a whole bunch of  experts 
and say, OK, well, let’s find a path. It says here is a play-
ground, let’s experiment. Go figure out something you 
want to do, something you can do to make money.”56
Innovation, argues CDI Senior Research Fellow Li, 
was Shenzhen’s lifeblood. In Beijing, he notes, gov-
ernment protected state-owned enterprises from fail-
ure, making innovation “only an option instead of  a 
necessity.” Innovation centers for Shanghai’s mostly 
foreign-owned businesses were located abroad. But 
“for enterprises in Shenzhen, no innovation led to their 
own demise,” he says.
Learning to Innovate
Business people were not the only ones in Shenzhen 
who had to learn to innovate. City government officials 
of  necessity became creative. As one research report 
says, in China’s centrally-planned economy “no local 
government had any clue as to how to build a city that 
would appeal to foreign investors.”57 Internet entre-
preneur Su agrees that Shenzhen’s first officials “had 
a weak educational background. . . . They rose from 
very low military ranks, actually without any wisdom or 
vision. But they were advocates for a market economy.”
Former Law and Regulation Office Director Zhou con-
firms that by and large, he and his colleagues had “zero 
experience in the fields at hand. But during Shenzhen’s 
trials and experiments, a lot of  specific issues began 
surfacing and I really just had to face up to them . . . 
.  What else could we do but come up with solutions?” 
In Beijing, officials solved problems that city leaders 
identified, but in Shenzhen, “I would take a look to see 
what the problems were in industries, and then I would 
cope with the problems I had personally identified,” 
he says.
As part of  that coping, city officials also had to learn 
when and how it was safe to depart from central gov-
ernment plans and policies. As an SEZ, it had unusual 
autonomy. But in the end, central diktats trumped 
local needs. For example, the city had promulgated 
successive master layout plans which the State Council 
approved: in 1982, 1986 (approved 1989), and 1996 
(approved 2000).58 Each plan stipulated the amount of  
land devoted to a host of  uses, from industrial to resi-
dential, utilities, and recreation.
But, as one study puts it, “the bold planning ideas were 
constrained by the planned population figure defined 
by the central government.”59 China’s central planners 
consistently projected lower-than-actual population for 
Shenzhen. The projections affected funding allocations, 
so the undercount undercut the city’s efforts to deal with 
residential overcrowding (illegal construction filled the 
void) and limited its ability to provide adequate social 
services.60 The contradiction also led to false statistics, 
for example the city’s per capita GDP rate.
Still, city officials did their best to create a climate 
friendly to investors, especially foreigners, and corpo-
rations. Most public officials saw the city’s interests as 
aligned with business. One Shenzhen anecdote illus-
trates this: in the late 1980s, the central government 
issued an arrest warrant for Huawei founder Ren 
Zhenfei because he allowed his employees to acquire 
company shares. The government claimed Ren had 
violated finance regulations. Vice Mayor Li Chuan-
fang, who was out of  town, immediately flew back to 
defend Ren and prevented the arrest.61
July 1997 saw the first appearance of  the Shenzhen 
Daily, the only English-language publication in south 
China (published by the Communist Party).62 In 1998, 
it streamlined the approval process for new businesses 
(including, that year, digital products firm Tencent) 
and reduced administrative interventions. It also estab-
lished an online procurement platform for government 
intended to facilitate transparency and deter corrup-
tion. It modified the laws and regulations governing 
audits of  projects in which the government had invest-
ed.63 As SUSTech Dean Huang puts it, Shenzhen tried 
to be a “small government, big society model, whereas 
inland China was a very traditional big government, 
small society model.”
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Pay them to come. The city also expanded on an earlier 
idea: pay technology entrepreneurs to consider Shen-
zhen. In 1992, the city had been the first in China 
to create city-sponsored entrepreneurship venture 
capital grants. The 1992 round of  grants were dis-
tributed from the so-called Innovation Fund aimed 
at small- to medium-sized businesses, while a second 
round of  investments in 1999 came from the High-
Tech Investment Fund.
In 2000, it put additional money into luring tech-
savvy overseas Chinese. The Municipal Finance 
Bureau allocated CN¥10 million ($1.46 million) and 
the Funds for Technologies another CN¥20 million 
($2.93 million) a year for overseas students to start 
businesses in Shenzhen. It opened a Shenzhen Over-
seas Chinese High-Tech Venture Park inside SHIP, 
which provided entrepreneurs with infrastructure as 
well as finance, consulting, training, networking, and 
marketing services.64
Results were encouraging: in 2000, high tech con-
tributed 42.3 percent of  Shenzhen’s gross industrial 
output value.65 It was ironic that the city pushed for 
digital innovation even as the central government, 
alarmed by the unfiltered information available on the 
Internet, reacted in 1998 with draconian restrictions 
on non-Chinese websites, throwing up what became 
known as the Great Firewall of  China.
We’ll handle it now. In some ways, Shenzhen could be 
seen as the victim of  its own success as Beijing cre-
ated scores of  other SEZs—and competition for Shen-
zhen—across the country. After Shenzhen proved the 
concept, in 1990 Shanghai’s Pudong district became 
an SEZ. In 1992, Beijing endorsed SEZ-like policies 
across some two dozen additional inland cities, includ-
ing all provincial capitals.
A 2003 People’s Daily article even contrasted Shenzhen 
unfavorably with Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, 
and predicted its decline to second-tier status. After 
iterating the alleged defects of  its financial markets, 
urban planning, safety, and social policies, the article 
noted that “obviously, Shenzhen is no longer in the 
same rank with Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou and 
other cities, but has begun to be comparable to cities 
such as Suzhou, Qingdao and Dalian.”66 The implicit 
message to Shenzhen, says technology pioneer David 
Li, was, “you have made your contribution to the 
motherland, and now the real cities of  China will take 
over. So you guys can go into the sunset and die.” But 
something unexpected happened: Shenzhen did not 
fade away. It all started with DVDs.
Intellectual Property
In the late 1990s, the primary entertainment vehicle 
for consumers was DVDs. In China, most DVDs were 
pirated and wouldn’t play in brand-name machines, 
so Shenzhen manufacturers created DVD players 
that would play anything—and sold millions of  them. 
“Intellectual property didn’t matter,” says David Li. 
“Everybody copied everybody . . . . The practice was 
everybody’s competing with everybody, but you don’t 
litigate” over copyright or patents.
Protecting intellectual work had never been a priority 
in China. Part of  the problem, explains lawyer Nan 
Jie of  the China Development Institute, was that the 
public never understood the concept of  intangible 
property. “If  I steal your chair, then you lose a chair to 
sit on. But if  I take away something ‘intangible,’ you 
are still able to keep using it, aren’t you? So they don’t 
consider this a form of  felony,” she says.
“Back then, we had a lot of  conflicts caused by tech 
professionals who quit their jobs and did their own 
start-ups with technologies taken from their previ-
ous employers,” recalls Zhou Luming. In the 1990s, 
his Law and Regulation Office crafted an intellectual 
property law for Shenzhen, “the first law concerning 
commercial secrets in Chinese legal history.”
WTO. But by 2000, the Chinese government was pay-
ing a lot more attention to intellectual property rights 
(IPR). It wanted to join the World Trade Organization 
(WTO); membership would mean lower global tariffs 
on Chinese goods and greater foreign investment. So 
China changed or updated numerous laws to meet 
membership requirements. For one thing, it acceded 
to the global Patent Cooperation Treaty. It cut sub-
sidies to state-owned enterprises and lowered its own 
tariffs and trade barriers in telecommunications, the 
financial sector, and other industries. It also, for the 
first time, allowed “capitalists” to become members 
of  the Communist Party. “Allowing private entrepre-
neurs into the party really reinforced a certain mutual 
dependence between the party-state and the private 
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economy,” said Kellee Tsai, dean of  humanities and 
social sciences at Hong Kong University of  Science 
and Technology.67
Importantly, the Chinese government promised 
strengthened protection of  IPR. Laws had been on 
the books since the “Rules for the Implementation of  
Trademark” law passed in 1983. In 1992, Beijing had 
signed an MOU with the U.S. on protecting intellec-
tual property.68 Even the Shenzhen Administration of  
Industry and Commerce had established a Shenzhen 
Trademark Office in 1993.69 But now the central gov-
ernment signaled its serious intention to enforce the law.
In December 2001, China formally joined the WTO. 
Within three years, exports doubled and in four, they 
tripled.70 Investment poured in, and manufacturers 
moved to China in droves. IBM alone set up eight 
companies, while Japan’s Sanyo Electric had 10.71 On 
July 21, 2005, Beijing introduced a managed floating 
foreign exchange rate system, and discontinued peg-
ging the yuan to the U.S. dollar. In December 2006, it 
opened its financial sector to foreign banks.
WTO membership was especially important to a city 
like Shenzhen, whose fortunes were so closely tied to 
the global economy. In 2002, the city set up a WTO 
Affairs Center for consulting, training, forums, and 
legal counsel.72 While hardly a backwater until now, 
Shenzhen was about to take on a role its leaders could 
hardly have imagined.
Administrative Reform
Shenzhen government started the century with an 
administrative reform. Paradoxically, the relatively 
light hand of  early Shenzhen bureaucrats had become 
heavier with time and experience, and segments of  the 
business community had started to complain about 
cumbersome government regulation. Others, on the 
other hand, pointed to insufficient enforcement; tens 
of  thousands of  unlicensed businesses, from retail out-
lets to restaurants, medical clinics, and real estate proj-
ects, operated unchecked.73
The 1980s and ‘90s had already seen five phases of  
reforms that restructured the bureaucracy’s role in 
economic activity and allowed it to focus on macro-
economic rather than day-to-day issues.74 In 1989, for 
example, a new Shenzhen Urban Planning and Land 
Administration Bureau brought planning, land admin-
istration, housing development, and management 
under one roof.75
In 2001, city leaders further combined disparate units 
that had dealt with transport, trade, and media into, 
respectively, the Transportation Bureau, the Trade and 
Industry Bureau, and the Culture Bureau. “These func-
tions were formerly scattered in different departments, 
and the reshuffle has resulted in evident improvement 
of  efficiency,” said Mayor Xu Zongheng.76
In 2003, the city tried to reduce what one observer saw 
as the government’s tendency to “overreach, neglect 
and misjudge” by separating government functions into 
discrete decision-making, executive, and supervisory 
bodies.77 The changes, wrote one expert, converted city 
government “from an omnipresent one to a more lim-
ited one, from a regulator/administrator to a service pro-
vider, and from a power-holder and influence-wielder 
to one with a civil service identity and accountability.”78 
It reduced the number of  administrative requirements 
for businesses from 1,091 to 239, and abolished 145 of  
225 temporary government agencies.79
In April, President Hu Jintao, on a visit, lauded Shen-
zhen as an “open window and experimental ground” 
that should remain in the vanguard.80 Meanwhile, 
the city’s 10th Five-Year Plan (2001–05) emphasized 
global economic integration and went beyond growth 
targets to discuss quality of  life, the environment, and 
the need for legal and democratic institutions.81
To lure foreign businesses, the city offered a raft of  
incentives from cheap land prices to tax breaks, rapid 
customs procedures, permission to repatriate profits 
and capital investments, duty-free import of  raw mate-
rials and intermediate goods, exemption from export 
taxes, and a limited license to sell domestically.82 The 
foreign corporate tax rate, for example, was 15 percent, 
compared to 30 percent for Chinese companies—until 
China in 2007 established a common effective tax 
rate of  25 percent for all firms. Still, for foreign firms 
it maintained a two-year exemption from corporate 
income tax, plus a half-rate for the next two years.
Additionally, foreign professionals were exempt from 
the 3 percent local income tax. The city offered indi-
vidual foreign businessmen and women housing subsi-
dies, assistance with children’s school tuition, and help 
in securing a hukou.83 The benefits helped persuade Jef-
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frey Holtmeier, in 2004 CEO of  Koncept International 
Inc. to locate to Shenzhen. The software development 
company was looking for a China base and, he says, 
chose Shenzhen “based on the attractive corporate tax 
incentives provided to technology companies.”
The reduction in income taxes and other benefits 
offered to our company enabled us to expand our 
development team in order to deliver our digital media 
solutions much faster to the market. Over a five-year 
period, these incentives amounted to more than US$1 
million, which was reinvested into the company.84
Taken together, the government reforms and business 
incentives put Shenzhen in a good position to benefit 
when the next technology revolution unfolded in its 
own backyard. It started quietly enough.
The Phone Tsunami
In the early 2000s, Shenzhen had reason to remember 
the lesson it learned from DVD players: make what the 
public wants, cheaply and quickly. Early in the 21st 
century, Nokia, Samsung Motorola, and others used 
Shenzhen factories to manufacture a growing line of  
cellphones. Local entrepreneurs proved ready and will-
ing to provide the same product, at a better price. “In 
2002–2003, the really big break comes to Shenzhen,” 
says David Li.
It is the introduction of  the GSM mobile phone.85 
[The cellphone] is one of  those devices where you 
don’t need to educate your users . . . . The only 
question the user has is, can I afford it? . . . . A 
lot of  phones were already produced here, so the 
know-how was here. Shenzhen jumped into mak-
ing mobile phones—and that’s the [start of  the] 
golden 10 years of  Shenzhen.
Eager entrepreneurs saw an opportunity. Cellphones 
could cost as much as $600 to $800 in the West. With 
reverse engineering, Shenzhen inventors were able to 
recreate the same phone for under $100, often using 
the exact same machinery. What phone makers found 
in Shenzhen was a complete supply chain, plus design-
ers and manufacturers. Huaqiangbei Commercial 
Street was the most visible symbol of  the city’s focus 
on electronics.86 It comprised over 20 electronics malls, 
some 10 stories high, spread across 21 million square 
meters.87 For years, the city’s small businessmen had 
turned to Huaqiangbei for components to make cheap 
copies of  others’ products. There was even a word for 
the knockoffs: shanzhai.
But a funny thing happened in the decade 2003–13. 
Shenzhen entrepreneurs flipped shanzhai from a liabil-
ity to an asset. Individuals discovered that instead of  
simply copying existing phones, they could produce 
better ones by adding features that appealed to con-
sumers. Seemingly overnight, manufacturers turned 
from reverse engineering (copying) to creative engi-
neering—inventing new commercial features and 
products. What’s more, their products cost less, much 
less. “These guys were figuring out how to copy pre-
mium goods on a shoestring budget,” noted one long-
time Shenzhen watcher.88
Individual inventors experimented, trying compo-
nent combinations to yield new capabilities. Creators 
moved from concept to product within weeks; the 
same process in the U.S. or Europe could take months. 
Inventors accepted that what was hot today would be 
obsolete tomorrow; they were already onto the next 
thing. Thousands of  small-scale technology producers 
made fortunes. Clever engineers could make $3,000 a 
day in Huaqianbei with ever-evolving products.
Whereas the economics of  production in the West 
mandated large manufacturing runs, companies fre-
quently created a few thousand units in Shenzhen to 
test a product’s appeal to consumers. Depending on 
the response, a firm could either cut its losses or ramp 
up production. Innovation examples included phones 
that accepted two SIM cards, UV lights to detect coun-
terfeit bills, compasses that pointed to Mecca, batter-
ies that lasted a week, or hoverboards.89 As Eric Pan, 
founder and CEO of  Seeed Studio, put it: “Ordering 
electronics here is now like service in a restaurant.”90
CDI’s Li Junkui observes that in Shenzhen, “all the 
work procedures are already segmented to the extreme. 
Specialized personnel are equipped to deliver work of  
optimum quality at each and every step of  the produc-
tion process.” Will Canine, co-founder of  a company 
that made robots to handle liquids, agreed:
When you’re creative, you want to try an idea and 
move on to the next idea and then the next idea. 
That’s the kind of  dynamic flow that’s possible in 
hardware in Shenzhen that’s not possible in the 
United States.91
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When Apple in 2007 launched the iPhone, it selected 
FoxConn in Shenzhen to assemble them.92 When the 
smartphone really took off in 2012, Shenzhen com-
panies such as Vivo, Oppo, Huawei and ZTE devised 
and marketed their own, cheaper, versions. At one 
point, estimates entrepreneur Su Ming, fully a third of  
the city’s population worked in cellphones.
Metrics of a Boom
The low-cost, low-skill work that distinguished early 
Shenzhen gave way to a more complex model. From 
being the world’s factory, Shenzhen became a technol-
ogy incubator. A center for information and communi-
cations technology, it designed and assembled desktops 
and laptops, software, and telecommunications equip-
ment. “Even Huawei benefited tremendously from the 
ecosystem,” says David Li. “Huawei could not have 
scaled without that supply chain.”
Private business boomed. By 2005, 135,000 of  the 
170,000 registered companies in Shenzhen were pri-
vate.93 Multiple technology giants had headquarters in 
Shenzhen, from Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. (tele-
coms) to Tencent Holdings Ltd. (Internet, gaming), 
Da-Jiang Innovation (drones), and ZTE (telecoms). 
Twenty-two local companies were among China’s top 
500 firms. The city was also home to some 300,000 
small-scale businesses.
The high-tech sector alone grew 46.5 percent over two 
decades, scoring a 2004 output of  $39.5 billion.94 In 
2007, Shenzhen topped all Chinese cities with 2,480 
new patents, and its high-tech businesses contrib-
uted a record amount to GDP.95 The following year, 
2008, high-tech output from companies whose assets 
included intellectual property was $75.49 billion.96
Foreign investments continued to pour in. As of  2008, 
FDI was growing an average 28.6 percent a year, and 
that year reached $4.03 billion.97 Of  the world’s top 500 
companies, 164 had investments in Shenzhen. Trade 
had leapt from $17 billion in 1979 to $287.5 billion in 
2007, while GDP had grown from $4 million in 1980 
to $114.47 billion in 2008. Per capita income rose in 
parallel, from $122 in 1980 to $13,196 in 2008.98 The 
Shenzhen stock exchange was as important as the one 
in Shanghai.
As of  2007, Shenzhen had been China’s premier export 
city for 15 years straight; its exports had grown to over 
$150 billion a year.99 In June 2008, the central govern-
ment named it China’s first National Innovative City.100
Riding the Tiger
While Shenzhen city officials were gratified that earlier 
policies had laid a strong foundation for growth, their 
challenge as the city prospered was to stay on top of  
business conditions and keep firms in the forefront of  
technology innovation. That meant rewarding what 
worked, while leaving the mechanics of  experimenta-
tion to companies.
Despite its progress, Shenzhen had its critics. Long-
time Shenzhen watcher George Zhibin Gu noted that 
“China’s modern tradition of  government domination 
is still going strong in Shenzhen,” and government was 
still too close to business.101 For example, “innumerable 
transactions that could be privately handled require 
official involvement,” from permission to engage in 
international trade to hiring and travel. Building a 
hotel required 105 separate approvals.102 Meeting gov-
ernment demands created fertile ground for corrup-
tion. One clerk, Wang Jianye (later executed), extorted 
millions of  dollars from businesses that needed his 
approval for foreign currency transactions.103
As one China-based business consultant put it: “the 
government must change its functional role to become 
a servant of  the public, rather than a mandarinate-like 
institution where supplicants must appear to beg for 
favors.”104 Special privileges for private firms “have 
attracted resentment from local Chinese business own-
ers,” he wrote. In response, some locals registered their 
companies offshore to gain the same privileges.
Corruption. What’s more, as elsewhere in China, the 
Shenzhen government suffered from corruption, in 
part, said critics, because government controlled too 
many business functions.105 Over the years, the city 
had arrested hundreds of  local government officials 
on corruption charges, including the top three leaders 
of  the Nanshan district: Party Chief  Yu Dehai, Chief  
Administrator He Cuben, and People’s Congress 
Chair Pen Hu, all convicted of  extortion.106 A gen-
eration later, in June 2009, the city detained deputy 
party secretary and Shenzhen Mayor Xu Zhongheng 
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on charges of  accepting CN¥33 million ($US5.1 mil-
lion) in bribes to change zoning, interfere in project 
contracts and facilitate promotions.107 Five other city 
officials also lost their jobs.
Meanwhile, principled city leaders tried to steer a 
middle course that allowed them to influence private 
sector behavior without controlling it. One tool that 
continued to be valuable was tax breaks. To encour-
age exports, for example, the city offered a 10 percent 
corporate tax rate to firms that exported 70 percent of  
output. High-tech enterprises and exporters paid only 
half  the city’s industrial land-use fees for the first five 
years of  operations. They paid no transaction fees for 
the transfer of  land-use rights; and were exempt from 
registration and trading charges for production and 
operations facilities.108
To promote innovation, the city gave companies using 
state-of-the-art technology the same 10 percent cor-
porate rate for three years. High-tech manufacturers 
enjoyed a 6 percent rebate on value-added taxes (the 
rate was 17 percent), in exchange for spending the 
refund on research and development. It gave software 
companies two years’ exemption from corporate taxes 
after their first profitable year, and half-rate the follow-
ing three years.109
Shenzhen lured some promising firms with gener-
ous subsidies. For example, BGI, the former Beijing 
Genomics Institute, moved to Shenzhen in 2008 after 
the city offered rent-free facilities and annual grants 
of  $3.1–$4.6 million for equipment and research.110 
At one point, BGI owned half  the world’s genome-se-
quencing machines. The city also got into the loan 
business, co-signing loan agreements with local 
banks—often at a discounted interest rate—for high-
risk but promising technology companies, or those 
with proprietary products.
It made grants as well, aimed at rewarding what it saw 
as the best companies. “Grants in Shenzhen are rarely 
project specific, but more reward oriented,” says 
David Li, whose Open Innovation Lab won a govern-
ment grant. “They tend to help companies that are 
already doing well. For the Lab, the government grant 
helped us bootstrap building an open innovation plat-
form that connected global makers and entrepreneurs 
to Shenzhen.”111
“The government serves the high-tech industry; it does 
not interfere with it,” observes former Vice Mayor Li 
Ming. “What a business does—how it operates, and 
how it sells its products—are all up to the enterprise 
itself.” Shenzhen’s government, he says, adopted the 
principle: “Operate in accordance to your own needs, 
and pay taxes in accordance with the law.” The price 
for such freedom was that a failing business could not 
expect government to bail it out. “If  your business fails, 
we will feel sorry, but we will not interfere,” he adds.
As Shenzhen grew and prospered, it came to rival and 
in some respects surpass Hong Kong. The island state, 
long a British colony, returned to Chinese rule in 1997, 
with the status of  Special Administrative Region (SAR). 
In November 2007, city leaders for the first time dared 
to voice a hope of  closer relations with its near-neigh-
bor. In a draft of  its 2030 Urban Development Strat-
egy, Shenzhen for the first time mentioned economic 
integration with Hong Kong and recommended the 
cities become a joint financial, trade and shipping hub, 
with a common capital market.112
The moniker Shen-Kong started to circulate. Clearly, 
economic integration faced many a barrier. For one, 
the Chinese currency was not yet fully convertible. 
Legal systems in Hong Kong and Shenzhen were dif-
ferent. The Hong Kong stock exchange was public, 
while the Chinese government owned the Shenzhen 
exchange. Finally, the two cities held different admin-
istrative ranks (SAR vs sub-provincial municipality).113 
Still, the very fact of  such an ambition marked a new 
level of  confidence in Shenzhen.
On the Social Front
If  government aimed for a light touch toward business, it 
could be decisive on living conditions within Shenzhen. 
City officials wanted it to be an attractive place to live. As 
former Vice Mayor Ming Li puts it: “As a government 
official here, you have to focus on studying policies and 
making plans to address the issues commonly faced by 
business and residents,” from better schools to hospitals, 
parks, and recreational facilities. “Social issues are inevi-
table as society progresses and develops,” observes Gong 
Jianhua, associate professor at the Shenzhen Institute of  
Administration, a Communist Party school.114 “We want 
this city to be a favorable place to live for everyone,” says 
Gong, who teaches social governance.
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In 2007, the official population figure was 8.5 million.115 
Some 85 percent had migrated from across China. The 
city continued to skew young, with an average age under 
30.116 Shenzhen already hosted a popular tourist attrac-
tion, the Windows of  the World theme park, which 
opened in 1994. In 2004, its first subway line began 
operation—a sign of  the city’s growth and ambition.
But it faced social pressures. In 2005, Mayor Xu Zhong-
heng listed “four difficulties” confronting Shenzhen: 
limited land; energy and water shortages; population 
pressure; and pollution.117 The already-overcrowded 
city, he noted, could no longer accommodate immi-
grants, who to date had helped drive GDP growth. He 
could have added to that growing income inequality. 
Many factory workers and retail clerks made barely 
$60 a month, and often went unpaid for months. 
Seven-day workweeks were not uncommon.118 Of  12 
million residents, only 1.75 million had a hukou—with 
its attendant benefits. For even temporary residence 
permits, the city for years charged the equivalent of  a 
month’s salary ($45).
To address some of  these ills, the city increased restric-
tions on land-use and sales approval, raised the min-
imum wage to $125 a month (the highest in China), 
and banned certain high-pollution industries like dye-
ing, papermaking, and leather tanning. The resulting 
increases in land and labor costs drove some labor-in-
tensive manufacturers to relocate.119 Shenzhen was not 
sorry to see them go; in fact, its district governments 
in early 2007 worked with industrial associations and 
other cities to establish 20 “enterprise transfer parks” 
that helped less competitive factories relocate to 
cheaper sites.120
To improve the ongoing scarcity of  hukou, the city in 2005 
allowed migrants to apply for permanent resident status. 
But to even qualify to apply, an applicant had to have paid 
at least CN¥200,000 ($24,700) in taxes over three years, a 
bar too high for low-wage workers.121 So in August 2008, 
Shenzhen introduced a 10-year, no-cost “permanent res-
idence card” for temporary migrant workers that would 
qualify them for the same housing, medical, education, 
and pension benefits as those with hukou. “The introduc-
tion of  the new residence certificate system is aimed at 
gradually removing the barriers between the permanent 
and migrant populations,” said Wang Pu, director of  the 
city Office of  Legislative Affairs.122
The city made other social welfare changes. In 2005, 
it introduced a basic health insurance program that 
mandated employers to contribute 1 percent of  salary 
and workers 50 cents a month toward healthcare. In 
2006, the city Labor Bureau also instructed factory 
owners to return millions in back pay that they owed 
migrant workers.123 The city built multiple city parks 
that took advantage of  Shenzhen’s naturally lush land-
scape. It applauded companies that hired renowned 
architects to design the skyscrapers that were rapidly 
filling in the city skyline.
Elections. The city even took steps to fulfill the 10th 
Five-Year Plan pledge to introduce more legal and 
democratic institutions. In March 2008, provincial 
Communist Party Secretary Wang Yang announced 
that “the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone must not 
only be at the forefront in economic construction, cul-
tural construction, and social construction, but also 
take the lead in building socialist democracy and the 
rule of  law.”124 In May 2008, city leaders announced 
that within three years it would hold a multi-candidate 
election for mayor on the Hong Kong model.125 Can-
didates would campaign first at the district level, where 
they could give speeches and engage in public debates.
In November 2008, Party Secretary Liu Yupu followed 
up with a proposal to eliminate over five years the exist-
ing seven district governments (which duplicated much 
of  city government) and replace them with a simpli-
fied municipal/district/neighborhood system more 
in tune with community needs. He called the new 
arrangement “one-level government and three-level 
governance,” compared to the earlier “two-level gov-
ernment and four-level governance” structure.126 “We 
will gradually eliminate district-level governments, and 
we will use the experience of  Hong Kong and Singa-
pore for reference,” said Party Secretary Liu.127
More momentously, as Shenzhen grew the government 
found that the Second Line internal boundary created 
numerous problems, from economic disparities between 
those outside versus inside the SEZ to smuggling, cor-
ruption, traffic congestion, daily difficulties for workers 
who lived outside where housing was cheaper, and more. 
In 2009, the Shenzhen Comprehensive Reform Exper-
imental Plan effectively dissolved the city’s internal 
boundary and officially added an additional 1,553 km² 
to Shenzhen for a sprawling municipality of  1,948 km².
____________________________________________________ By Accident or Design? Shenzhen as a Global Hub for Digital Entrepreneurs"| 265
But just as it burst through its borders, Shenzhen’s 
physical growth came up sharply against a global eco-
nomic contraction that cost the world trillions.
2008 Hits Hard
The global economic meltdown of  2008 hit China 
sharply, if  not as hard as elsewhere. Nationally, exports 
fell in November 2008 for the first time in seven years.128 
In Guangdong province, it caused the collapse of  thou-
sands of  industrial enterprises. In the first 10 months 
of  2008, 15,661 enterprises province-wide closed their 
doors.129 Shenzhen alone lost 50,000 jobs in the final 
months of  2008.130
Professor Gong of  the Institute of  Administration sees 
the crisis as “a major turning point.” Before the shock, 
low-end manufacturing had still dominated the local 
economy. When many of  those factories went bank-
rupt, the municipal government recast its view of  the 
future to prioritize high-tech. “This was when the 
high-tech industry came to replace manufacturing as 
the leading industry in Shenzhen,” says Gong.
Nationwide, the 2008 global financial crisis put many 
political and economic reforms on hold. For exam-
ple, the national government restored tax breaks for 
exporters and backed off pollution controls. It granted 
local authorities permission to freeze minimum wages 
and suspend employers’ social insurance contributions. 
Tolerance of  political dissent narrowed.
In Shenzhen, reform plans “now seem derailed as offi-
cials are focused on maintaining social stability,” wrote 
a reporter.131 Like other cities, it relaxed enforcement 
of  protections for migrants that had come into effect 
under the new national Labor Contract Law on Janu-
ary 1, 2008.132 On the other hand, the city government 
post-2008 steadily increased the municipal budget 
for social goods like health insurance, unemployment 
insurance, and education from a floor of  60 percent, 
says Professor Gong. “The percentage is still steadily 
increasing every year,” he adds.
But as the rest of  the world and China emerged from 
the 2008 financial earthquake and its many after-
shocks, much had changed. One new element was that 
China felt it had weathered the downturn better than 
many capitalist countries. The leadership felt newly 
emboldened: a planned socialist market economy had 
just proven itself  resilient. Looking at the facts, lead-
ers felt planning worked. What’s more, one of  China’s 
most innovative cities, Shenzhen, remained prosper-
ous. If  innovation was the next frontier in a successful 
economy, then China would plan for innovation.
Made by China
As early as 2001, China had signaled its intention to 
promote scientific creativity. The 10th Five-Year Plan 
(2001–05) first singled out science and technology 
innovation as a national goal. Then in February 2006, 
the State Council published guidelines for a 15-year 
Medium- and Long-term Plan for Science and Technol-
ogy Development (2006–20).133 The plan aimed to “shift 
China’s current growth model to a more sustainable one, 
to make innovation the driver of  future economic growth 
and emphasize the building of  an indigenous innova-
tion capability.”134 It called for major breakthroughs in 
basic research, and for more Chinese patents. A 2010 
State Council directive promoted aggressive growth in 
“strategic emerging industries,” from environmentally 
friendly technologies to biotechnology.135
The national 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–15) took the 
innovation theme further. The plan put in place pol-
icies and practices to prioritize domestic innovation 
efforts, promote domestic industry champions, and 
encourage technology acquisitions.136 In June 2015, 
the State Council issued “Opinions on Several Pol-
icy Measures to Promote Mass Entrepreneurship and 
Innovation,” which laid out 30 actions in 10 areas, 
including fiscal and tax policy, for a transition to inno-
vation-powered growth.137
Made in China. In May 2015, Beijing published a 
“Made in China 2025” plan that aligned state and pri-
vate industry’s efforts to establish the country as the 
world’s preeminent manufacturing power by 2049. It 
listed 10 industries in which it aimed to become glob-
ally competitive within 10 years; all the industries were 
high-tech, from robotics to aerospace and advanced 
IT. Among other goals, the plan called for a 40 per-
cent increase in domestic components of  essential 
technology by 2020, and 70 percent by 2025.138 The 
plan allocated $300 billion for China to become largely 
self-sufficient within seven years in multiple industries 
from aircraft to robots.139
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The 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–20), dubbed Internet 
Plus, built on this.140 Innovation became a national 
goal, with an emphasis on research and development 
in 10 key industries: aviation, agriculture, electrical 
power, new energy sources, automobiles, robotics, IT, 
new materials, rail transport, maritime engineering, 
biomedicine, and medical equipment. Innovation, it 
stated “must be placed at the heart of  China’s devel-
opment and advanced in every field, from theory to 
institutions, science, technology, and culture . . . . Inno-
vation should permeate the work of  the Party and the 
country and become an inherent part of  society.141
In his 2015 annual government work report to the 
National People’s Congress, Premier Li Keqiang used 
the term “innovation” 38 times; a year later, he used 
it 65 times.142 “Innovation is the primary driving force 
for development and must occupy a central place in 
China’s development strategy,” he wrote in 2016.143 
On August 8, 2016, the State Council issued a separate 
Five-Year Plan specifically for Science, Technology and 
Innovation. The blueprint aimed to increase science 
and technology to 20 percent of  GDP.144 The goal: put 
to rest the connotations of  low quality associated with 
the label Made in China, and substitute instead Made 
by China. A December 2016 State Council plan again 
emphasized emerging industries.145 In 2017, the state 
announced a separate strategy to become dominant in 
artificial intelligence.146
The pivot toward the private sector pioneered in Shen-
zhen had by 2017 taken firm hold across China. For 
example, revenues at state-owned enterprises in 2013 
were six times higher than in 2000, but at private com-
panies they were 18 times higher. SOE profits were 
seven times higher over the same period, but at private 
firms they rose by a factor of  23.147 In 2017, the pri-
vate sector produced more than 60 percent of  GNP, 
employed over 80 percent of  urban workers, and gen-
erated 90 percent of  new jobs.148
The national government in ways large and small 
acknowledged Shenzhen’s contribution. In December 
2012, President Xi Jinping—in his first visit outside 
Beijing as top Party leader—came to Shenzhen to offer 
his respects to a statue of  Deng.149 Premier Li Keqiang 
in January 2015 visited Shenzhen incubators, where he 
touted innovation and start-ups.
The 13th national FYP (2016–20) even referred spe-
cifically to the Shenzhen region. Chapter 37, Section 
4 said that “we will accelerate the shift towards innova-
tion-driven development and work to make this region 
an internationally influential center of  innovation . . . . 
We will support the Pearl River Delta as it leads 
opening up, innovation, transformation and upgrad-
ing, and accelerate the development of  science and 
technology centers and industrial innovation centers 
in Shenzhen.”150
As it had been first in China to a market econ-
omy, Shenzhen intended to be first in modeling an 
innovation economy.
Setting the Innovation Pace
Shenzhen was already China’s capital of  private 
industry. In comparison, Beijing had the most state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), while Shanghai’s top-10 
companies were all foreign owned. But 90 percent 
of  Shenzhen companies were private. Former Vice 
Mayor Li Ming identifies its four pillar industries as 
finance; logistics (air, rail, and marine shipping); cul-
tural/creative industries; and high tech.
City leaders tried first to understand which pub-
lic policies had so far made Shenzhen a technology 
leader. Those they would keep and amplify. Then 
they looked at the most successful local digital tech-
nology companies; what were the ingredients to their 
breakthroughs? Finally, what additional public poli-
cies would make it likely that other firms could follow 
where the pioneers had led?
One essential success factor emerged consistently: 
people. Not just any people, but those with advanced 
digital technology expertise, and those with the imag-
ination to lead the pack in developing new products. 
City leaders determined to make attracting and retain-
ing the most talented people a priority for Shenzhen’s 
next chapter.
To attract talented individuals, the city in the early 
2000s had already created a senior corporate manager 
recommendation and evaluation center. It subsidized 
workplaces for post-doctoral professionals and granted 
researchers up to RMB 50,000 ($7,321) a year toward 
expenses. It also budgeted RMB 200 million ($29.28 
million) for awards: the Talent in Industrial Develop-
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ment and Innovation Award; the Shenzhen Mayor’s 
Award (2004); the Shenzhen Science and Technology 
Progress Award; and the Shenzhen Technological 
Invention Award.151
Peacocks. In April 2011, Shenzhen launched what it 
called the Peacock Plan to lure foreigners, including 
overseas Chinese, to live and work in the city. “There 
is definitely a shortage of  talented people,” confirmed 
Liu Yang, an HR manager at Peking University Shen-
zhen Graduate School.152 The city budgeted $12 mil-
lion over five years to attract foreigners who would spur 
innovation. Those individuals could claim subsidies up 
to $230,000 depending on skill level. Each applicant 
had to submit proposals in Chinese and defend them 
before a board set up by the city government.153 Also in 
2011, the city created the Shenzhen Science and Tech-
nology Innovation Committee to coordinate policy 
across departments.154
Individual firms quickly got the message: innovation 
would yield rewards. In 2014, Shenzhen firms invested 
more than CN¥64 billion (US$10 billion), or 4 percent 
of  GDP, in research and development (R&D), putting it 
on a par with South Korea and Israel.155 The Shenzhen 
Municipal Government Plan aimed to increase that to 
4.25 percent of  GDP by 2020.156 The city rewarded 
companies for creating original products. “The more 
patents a company has, the more support it can receive 
from the government. If  you get an international pat-
ent, the government will even reward you,” says Gong. 
In 2018, five Nobel Prize winners opened labs in Shen-
zhen.
Individuals benefited as well as firms. Under the Pea-
cock Plan, the city gave senior professionals hukou for 
themselves, their spouses, and children. It even gave 
qualified individuals free license plates—a significant 
perk in a city that strictly limited licenses as one way 
to combat air pollution.157 As of  2018, says Gong Jian-
hua, the city contributed CN¥3,600 ($600) a month 
toward housing for high-tech talent, both Chinese 
and foreign. In 2018, some 200,000 people qualified 
for the subsidy.
City plans also emphasized innovation. At a 2015 meet-
ing of  the Sixth Shenzhen Municipal People’s Con-
gress, Municipal Committee Secretary Ma Xingrui 
laid out a five-year blueprint to remain competitive in 
high tech, upgrade infrastructure for service industries, 
and scale up education and medical services.158 The 
city already led the world in sectors such as supercom-
puting, gene sequencing, and metamaterials, and was 
home to 1,283 laboratories.159
A year later, Shenzhen’s Five-Year Plan (published 
April 2016), aimed for GDP of  CN¥2.6 trillion ($402 
billion) by 2020, compared to the current CN¥1.75 
trillion. That implied annual growth of  over 8 percent 
and made the city a strong contender against Beijing, 
Shanghai, and Hong Kong, even though Shenzhen 
was only one-third the size of  Shanghai and one-
eighth of  Beijing. The plan called for Shenzhen to host 
10,000 high-tech companies by 2020, double the 2015 
number.160 “The most important role government can 
play to help enterprises is to make a general develop-
ment plan for the entire industry,” says former Vice 
Mayor Li Ming. “The government also plays a role by 
pushing and guaranteeing the implementation of  its 
policies and strategies.”
Incubators. The city also did its best to make starting 
a new company as easy as possible. It already allo-
cated up to CN¥3 million (US$0.44m) in subsidies for 
technology incubators—workspaces where inventors 
(often called “makers”) could collaborate and which 
typically offered mentorship, administrative services, 
and sometimes funding. In 2018, estimates Gong, the 
city government spent CN¥20–30 billion on high-tech 
from a total budget of  CN¥400 billion. David Li notes 
that the city grants “come with no strings attached. It’s 
not like ‘OK, you get this grant and this is what we, 
as Shenzhen government, are thinking about what the 
maker movement should be.’ It’s ‘you guys know bet-
ter than us about the maker movement, so here’s the 
money, go experiment.’”
Reaping the Spoils
The pro-innovation policies appeared effective. From 
2010–15, Shenzhen’s GDP grew 79 percent.161 High-
tech exports jumped from $11.4 billion in 2001 to 
$140.3 billion in 2015. Over the same period, the 
number of  international patent applications exploded, 
from 331 to 13,308.162 Concurrently, the city main-
tained pressure on low-grade manufacturers to exit; 
from 2012 to 2017, announced Mayor Xu Qin, more 
than 17,000 small factories closed.163
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Nonetheless, Shenzhen in 2016 was home to more 
than a million private companies—including Internet, 
biotech, new energy, new materials, and IT firms.164 
Manufacturers churned out circuit boards, computer 
chips, LEDs, touch screens, and much more. More 
than 25,000 companies manufactured a quarter of  
the world’s cellphones.165 Other substantial enterprises 
were China Vanke (real estate), BYD (cars), Pin An 
Insurance, and China Merchants Bank.166 Innovative 
start-ups included Prynt Case, a French company 
that created a photo-printing device for smartphones; 
PetCube, maker of  interactive cameras for owners to 
monitor and play with their pets from afar; and Wear-
Vigo, producer of  headsets to keep drivers alert.
Serial Internet entrepreneur Su Ming reports that 
individuals worked at a punishing pace. He references 
the “9-9-6” work schedule: 9 a.m. to 9 p.m., six days 
a week, no vacation. Work life for business owners, he 
says, “is like a jungle, no rules, no laws . . . . Nobody can 
take a break.”167 He feels fortunate to have a two-day 
weekend. That was the Shenzhen culture, observed 
hardware innovator Jackie Wu: “There’s sort of  a 
pragmatic, can-do attitude that everyone has toward 
making a new product that makes the process very effi-
cient and everyone’s on the hunt for new ideas, prod-
ucts, and markets.”168
A few companies hit gold, growing by leaps and 
bounds as their products found markets both domesti-
cally and abroad. Telecom firm Huawei, for example, 
had established an expansive campus beyond the hills 
above Shenzhen where it co-located manufacturing, 
R&D, and housing for employees. In 2016, Huawei 
contributed 7 percent to the city’s GDP (CN¥143 bil-
lion, or US$20.6 billion)—equal to the contribution of  
the city’s next 20 largest companies.169 Of  its 60,000 
employees, some 25,000 worked in R&D; between 
2007–17, it spent $400 billion on research.170
Across the street was the FoxConn campus with 
30,000 employees. Tencent, the Internet and online 
gaming giant that also created the messaging app 
WeChat, in September 2015 became the largest Inter-
net company in Asia by value. In April 2017, it sur-
passed Wells Fargo as the 10th largest publicly traded 
company in the world, worth $250 billion.171 ZTE, 
which also made telecom equipment, in 2017 earned 
CN¥108.8 billion.172
Silicon Valley 2. Many dubbed Shenzhen the new Sil-
icon Valley.173 Fully 20 percent of  China’s PhDs 
worked in its laboratories and research institutes.174 
Its per capita GDP, the highest in China, had grown 
a mind-boggling 24,569 percent from 1978 to 2014, 
when it hit $25,000.175 GDP growth, which had run at 
an astronomical 35 percent per year until 1995, had 
abated to a more modest but still robust 14 percent a 
year through 2014. While still a manufacturing hub, 
its products increasingly were high-tech, new-tech, and 
clean-tech; these industries grew from 28.8 percent 
of  GDP in 2010 to 35.6 percent in 2014.176 The city 
ranked eighth worldwide in number of  billionaires.177
At the same time, Shenzhen was not dependent for its 
success on a handful of  behemoths. “The way Shen-
zhen is innovative is not just that we have a couple of  
superstars,” says David Li. “I mean, if  you take Hua-
wei out of  Shenzhen tomorrow, Shenzhen would not 
be affected.” He points to the saturated smartphone 
market as an example. Yes, he notes, Apple had 14 
percent of  the global market, and Samsung had 15 
percent. “But that leaves the rest of  the 71 percent,” 
he says. “Guess who they are? They are all Shenzhen 
companies, with the exception of  Xiaomi. . . . [There 
are] hundreds, probably thousands, of  brands, all 
headquartered in Shenzhen.”
High-tech talent. Moreover, the city’s efforts to attract 
top talent were working. In 2015 alone, the Peacock 
Plan attracted 18 R&D teams specialized in biology, 
pharmaceuticals, life sciences, software, telecommu-
nications, and new energy. By 2016, it had brought 
in 59 teams and 1,219 high-caliber professionals.178 
One UK-based provider of  defense reports found 
China’s innovation goals credible. It wrote in 2016 
that “one of  the enduring myths in many Western 
CEO-suites is that the Chinese are great at copying 
and stealing but will have difficulty ‘out-inventing’ 
the West. This arrogant and outdated hypothesis is 
crumbling fast.”179
Public funds. Shenzhen also anted up public funding for 
digital technology. In 2015, the city and district govern-
ments together allocated CN¥20.93 billion to new tech-
nology and started 156 strategic technology projects.180 
The city announced that corporate plus municipal 
spending on R&D would reach 4.25 percent of  GDP 
by 2020.181
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In November, Shenzhen announced its first Innova-
tion Competition of  International Talent. The contest, 
open to IT professionals worldwide, offered $80,000 
to the winner (and lesser amounts to others) to open 
a high-tech business or conduct research in the city. 
The five areas of  interest were IT, electronic science 
and technology, biological/life sciences technology, 
advanced manufacturing, and materials and energy.182 
Those who succeeded in opening a business within six 
months would earn bonus payments. About half  the 
funding for the prizes came from venture capital firms; 
another $100 million came from the city government.
In 2016, the Shenzhen Human Resources and Social 
Security Bureau organized additional funding for 
tech start-ups.183 The city continued some older mea-
sures like rent assistance, and loans and subsidies; 
and added new incentives, like technical fairs and 
publicity. Under the “interest subsidy loan policy, the 
bank will loan you funds to do R&D while the state 
helps pay the interest,” clarifies Nan Jie of  the China 
Development Institute.
Districts and institutes. To give the newly-arrived profes-
sionals places to work, the city also got into the business 
of  planning and operating dedicated high-tech indus-
trial districts. On January 17, 2017, Shenzhen Party 
chief  and Mayor Xu Qin announced detailed plans 
to build 10 research institutes by 2020 in such fields 
as mathematics, medicine, and clean energy. The city 
also funded 10 IT and life science laboratories led by 
Nobel prizewinners, as well as 10 overseas innovation 
centers.184 “Under the new demand of  global mar-
kets, we must readjust our development direction and 
aim high in order to help China become influential 
in the world in terms of  technology, manufacturing 
and innovation,” Mayor Xu said at a press confer-
ence. That month, for example, Shenzhen signed a 
memorandum of  understanding with Hong Kong 
to develop an 87-hectare innovation and technology 
park at the Lok Ma Chau Loop, a piece of  land owned 
by Hong Kong but intended for both Shenzhen and 
Hong Kong companies.185
Maturing Market Economy
As it grew, Shenzhen became a magnet for venture 
capital. In 2016, the 100 top Shenzhen venture capi-
tal funds invested a total CN¥58 billion ($8.3 billion), 
up 40 percent from 2015.186 Government at both the 
national and city level decided to get into the game, 
and stakes in several VC funds. As early as 2007, the 
city had created the Shenzhen Venture Capital Ser-
vices Platform as part of  the Shenzhen High-Tech 
Industrial Park (SHIP).187 Then came the State Ven-
ture Fund, founded in August 2016 with $30 billion.188 
In February 2017, the national Ministry of  Finance, 
together with the National Development and Reform 
Commission, launched a Shenzhen venture capital 
firm for emerging industries, funded at CN¥10 billion 
($1.5 billion) and supervised by the state-owned private 
equity and venture firm Infotech Capital.189
Social goods. The city also continued to invest in social 
goods such as education, electric buses (as of  Decem-
ber 2017, all city buses were electric), a fast rail con-
nection to Hong Kong, parks, and culture. One global 
consulting firm reported that Shenzhen led the coun-
try in smart transport (intelligent traffic lights, grids, 
etc.). Its imaging technology identified traffic violators 
with 95 percent accuracy. The city hoped its parking 
management system would remove 330,000 vehicles a 
day from the roads.190
“We hope to become the benchmark for the country’s 
new smart cities and raise our smart capabilities to a 
world class level by 2020,” said Wu You, deputy secre-
tary general of  the Shenzhen municipal government, 
in June 2018.191 Hu Xiaoqing, deputy director of  Shen-
zhen’s Economy, Trade and Information Commission, 
predicted that by 2020 the city would offer one-stop 
shopping for business-related government services, 
while individuals would be able to interact with gov-
ernment exclusively online.
Shenzhen spent generously to make itself  alluring to 
qualified professionals. But city leaders also recognized 
and tried to redress its enormous and growing income 
gap. Officially, its 2017 population stood at 12.53 mil-
lion.192 But unofficially, it was nearly 23 million, espe-
cially during the pre-winter holidays high-production 
season. Even with reform, only 25 percent held a hukou; 
some 6 million unregistered residents continued to 
live in teeming urban villages.193 Institute of  Admin-
istration Professor Gong Jianhua notes that Shenzhen 
“is a young city, but it already has a huge wealth gap 
and income inequality. So the government is trying to 
solve conflict between economic classes by providing 
270 |"SIPA’s Entrepreneurship & Policy Initiative Working Paper Series  _______________________________________________________
more and more public benefits. On the other hand, the 
amount of  benefits depends on GDP.”
Incubators. Shenzhen also continued to promote accel-
erators and incubators like H@xlr8r (HAX), Shen-
zhen Open Innovation Lab, and Chaihuo.194 By 
November 2017, HAX—which provided technical 
and financial support to hardware companies—had 
fostered 118 start-ups.195 In 2018, the city hosted some 
1,000 accelerators.196
IPR redux. Shenzhen companies had also learned the 
value of  protecting intellectual property. More and 
more turned to the courts to defend their own inven-
tions. In 2016, the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s 
Court heard 14,887 IPR cases, 63 percent more than 
in 2015. The public prosecutor arrested 669 criminal 
suspects and prosecuted 682 suspected of  infringing 
on trademark and copyright. “We have strengthened 
the judicial protection of  the core rights of  the par-
ties engaged in scientific and technological innovation, 
trying to smooth out their worries in that respect,” 
said Wang Yanlin, chief  procurator of  the Shenzhen 
Procuratorate (public prosecutor).197 In a strike at cor-
ruption, the procuratorate also investigated six officials 
for “meddling in the approval of  applications for high-
tech funds or the granting of  fiscal subsidies.”198
CDI lawyer Nan Jie calls Shenzhen “a pioneer city” 
in protecting ideas. “Chinese courts spent two to 
three decades neglecting and being impotent when it 
came to intellectual property protection,” she notes. 
“But now they are getting much stricter . . . . Shen-
zhen was the first in China to punish intellectual rights 
infringement as a crime.” In December 2017, Shen-
zhen set up both its own intellectual property court 
and a financial court.199 “Nowadays, the younger 
generation always takes care of  intellectual property 
as a priority when they initiate any high-tech project,” 
says Nan Jie. “Ten years ago, nobody would have even 
thought of  that.”
The city’s 2017 GDP was CN¥2.2 trillion (US$318 
billion). In October 2018, President Xi Jinping visited 
Guangdong and reaffirmed the government’s commit-
ment to small businesses. “China’s reform and opening 
up will never stop,” he said.200
The Path Ahead
As of  early 2019, Shenzhen appeared well positioned 
as a global hub for digital entrepreneurs. It had the 
leadership, the infrastructure, and the track record to 
compete internationally. The dynamism of  its entre-
preneurial community, its youthful population, and the 
willingness of  local government to support and encour-
age private industry in the context of  wider regional 
growth all suggested it would remain a 21st-century 
center for experimentation.
That was not to minimize the challenges. Many could 
be traced back to the same frenzied population growth 
that had fueled its prosperity. The city, for example, had 
China’s highest property prices. Guo Wanda, vice presi-
dent of  the China Development Institute, noted in 2016 
that soaring land and housing prices resulted in higher 
costs of  doing business. “If  Shenzhen cannot find ways 
to solve these problems, it will soon enter a bottleneck 
period in its development,” he said.201 The World Bank 
warned as early as 2010 that “the conflicts between 
social development and economic development, 
between income generation and environmental deg-
radation, and between economic growth and unequal 
income distribution are becoming more severe than 
ever.”202 The same might have been written in 2018.
The city also, as it would be the first to acknowledge, 
remained desperate for high-caliber professionals. 
Despite opening new universities and research insti-
tutes, one estimate put the number of  unfilled high-
skilled jobs in 2015 at 300,000.203 Nor could new 
laboratories and facilities alone guarantee that inno-
vation would follow. “Unfortunately, the rote learn-
ing and examination-oriented education model in 
[Chinese] colleges and universities is not conducive to 
creative thinking,” judged a World Economic Forum 
report in 2016. “China has yet to create a dynamic cul-
ture that encourages innovation and tolerates failure.”
Too often, noted Liu Xielin, associate dean of  the 
School of  Management at the Chinese Academy of  
Sciences’ Graduate University in Beijing, “there’s a 
lot of  government money for R&D that goes into uni-
versities and institutes, but the research that is done is 
far away from real industrial needs.”204 What’s more, a 
mismatch persisted between graduates’ skills and job 
market needs; as of  2016, nearly 40 percent of  gradu-
ates could not find suitable jobs.205
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But the question that went to the heart of  Shenzhen 
was whether intellectual risk-taking remained safe and 
rewarding. That applied to government officials as 
well as business leaders. Zhou Luming, who left gov-
ernment in 2015 to found an incubator, yearns for a 
return to the “problem-solving oriented style of  man-
agement that government practiced in the 1990s, an 
ability that has been weakened immensely in recent 
years.” He continues:
The central government’s restrictions on govern-
ment officials’ power in Shenzhen is now at the 
same level as in any other part of  China. In the 
past, you had permission to experiment and take 
wrong steps, but now only one wrong step will cost 
you so much more than it possibly could in the past. 
There is much more risk in making mistakes . . . . 
On the one hand, Shenzhen is a large city, which 
demands standardized and regulated management. 
On the other hand, you can hardly innovate in an 
environment that has no flexibility . . . . The key is 
to find a new balance between the two.
Then there was the fading venture capital market. 
In early 2018, it slowed markedly, raising less than 
two-thirds of  the previous year and making only half  
the investment. “Many investors in private equity 
and venture capital funds want to take their money 
back” said Zheng Kaixing, founder and CEO of  the 
Shenzhen-based online asset management company 
Jinfuzi.206 The central government still controlled Chi-
nese banks, foreign exchange rates, and the media, so 
it might be able to arrest the slide. But a high debt 
level and a 2019 nascent trade war with the United 
States limited its options.
The city’s emphasis on incubators and accelerators 
also had its skeptics. Kai-fu Lee, who in 2009 founded 
Innovation Works, one of  the earliest incubators, 
doubted that government could run them effectively. 
“There are very few successful examples of  govern-
ment-run incubators around the world,” he said in a 
2016 interview.207 David Li notes that half  the acceler-
ators, makerspaces and incubators started in 2015 had 
closed by 2019. Moreover, it remained challenging for 
small to medium-size businesses to secure bank loans. 
State-owned enterprises had no trouble, but entre-
preneurs were consistently obliged to turn to private 
sources of  funding.
Finally, questions had emerged about the staying 
power of  Reform and Opening in general, especially 
after Xi Jinping in February 2018 abolished term lim-
its, in effect becoming president for life. “Reform and 
Opening has already failed, but no one dares to say 
it,” said historian Zhan Lifan. “The current system 
has created severe social and economic segregation.”208 
In a climate of  intensified surveillance (facial recogni-
tion, security cameras), Internet walls, and trade wars, 
such critics questioned whether a city like Shenzhen—
founded on principles of  creativity and innovation—
could thrive.
But as its history demonstrated, Shenzhen had long 
confounded expectations. Chances were it could do 
so again. In 2018, the city spent CN¥100 billion, or 
4.16 percent of  GDP, on research and development, 
with plans to increase that number steadily.209 In May 
2019, it renewed tax breaks for high-level technology 
professionals. At a Future Forum innovation sum-
mit, Deputy Mayor Wang Lixin announced income 
tax reductions from a rate of  45 percent to as low as 
15 percent for some categories of  overseas and local 
innovators.210 The city’s Commerce Bureau started 
training for exporters on how best to comply with 
U.S. intellectual property law.
Above all, Shenzhen was ideally positioned to demon-
strate whether government by central plan, pre-set 
goals, and administrative changes could sustain an 
innovation economy in the long term. December 2018 
marked the 40th anniversary of  China’s Open Door 
Policy. Shenzhen, notes one report, was a “huge social 
experiment in transforming a centrally planned econ-
omy into one with market mechanisms through plans 
and pilot reform measures.”211 In the view of  Shen-
zhen scholar Jonathan Bach:
. . . the staggering growth that made Shenzhen syn-
onymous with the rise of  ‘Made in China’ must be 
regarded as much as the result of  massive impro-
visation as of  master planning. And today, what 
started as a city of  exception is a site of  an ongoing 
struggle to define the rule.212
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Appendix 1
FDI and Other Investment in Shenzhen 1981–2006
Total and Foreign Direct Investment in the City of  Shenzhen 1981-2006
Year
Total Investment  
(RMB Billion)
Total Investment  
(US$ Billion)
FDI in the City  
(US$ Billion)
FDI Share of  
Total Investment (%)
1981 0.30 0.17 0.09 49.61
1985 3.33 1.13 0.18 15.85
1986 2.49 0.72 0.36 50.64
1990 6.23 1.30 0.39 29.92
1995 27.58 3.30 1.31 39.66
1996 32.75 3.94 2.05 52.06
1997 39.31 4.74 1.66 35.03
2000 61.97 7.49 1.96 26.20
2005 118.11 14.42 2.97 20.59
2006 127.37 15.98 3.27 20.46
Source: calculation by the author and also [14, 53].
From Jianfa Shen, “Urban Growth and Sustainable Development in Shenzhen City 1980–2006,” Open Environmental Sciences, 
November 2008. See: www.researchgate.net/profile/Jianfa_Shen/publication/49466901_Urban_Growth_and_Sustainable_
Development_in_Shenzhen_City_1980-2006/links/549a42d70cf2b803713591ff/Urban-Growth-and-Sustainable-Development-in-
Shenzhen-City-1980-2006.pdf
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Appendix 2
Shenzhen Five-Year Plans and Master Layout Plans
Socioeconomic and Spatial Plans in Shenzhen
Phase 1: 1980–1985
 • Rapid development of  domestic economic linkages
 • Outward processing industrial activities
 1980  Draft Master Layout Plan
 1981–1985  Sixth Five-Year Plan
 1982  Shenzhen Socioeconomic Outline Plan (SSEOP)
 1982  The First Master Layout Plan
Phase 2: Mid-1980s to mid-1990s
 • Export-oriented economy through attracting foreign direct investment
 • Economic restructuring toward high-tech and tertiary-sector development
 1986-1990  Seventh Five-Year Plan
 1986  Second Master Layout Plan
 1989  The Comprehensive Report on Modifications of  the Second Master Layout Plan
 1991–1995  Eighth Five-Year Plan and the Shenzhen Socioeconomic 10-Year Development Plan
Phase 3: Mid-1990s onward
 •  Planning control extended as Longgan and Bao’an Counties were turned into Districts within the 
Shenzhen Municipality in 1993
 •  A need to reinvent Shenzhen in the face of  mounting competition within China and in  
the global economy
 1993  Review of  Master Layout Plan started.
 1995  Municipal Government approved the Outline for Modifying the  
Shenzhen Master Layout Plan
 1996–2000  Ninth Five-Year Plan
 1996  Draft Third Master Layout Plan
 2000  Third Master Layout Plan approved by the State Council
 2001–2005  Tenth Five-Year Plan
Source: Authors.
From Mee Kam Ng and Wing-Shing Tang, “The Role of  Planning in the Development of  Shenzhen, China,” Eurasian Geography and 
Economics, 2004. See: www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.2747/1538-7216.45.3.190
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Appendix 3
Planned vs. Actual Socioeconomic Metrics in Shenzhen
Planning Targets of  the Socioeconomic Plans in Shenzhen

























0.33 1.00  
by 2000
0.88 0.6 2.02 2.5 3.0 3.45 4.0 4.8 4.33
Temporary pop. 
(million)
0.01 0.40 0.2 1.33 1.6 1.9 2.46 n.a. n.a. 3.08
Pct. temporary 
pop.






0.32 0.48 0.40 0.69 0.9 1.15 0.99 n.a. n.a. 1.25
GOVI3  
(mill. RMB)
106.30 1,200.00  
by end of  
20th century
2,466.60 5,600 22,022 30,000 122,648.9 175,000 500,000 267,241.80
GDP  
(mill. RMB)
270.10 3,902.20 5,000 17,167 25,000 45,000 79,569.5 165,000 300,000 166,546.50
Per capita GDP 835 4,809 6,800 8,724 10,000 15,000 23,381 41,000 63,100 39,745
Export value  
(mill. $)
11.20 563.40 1,0004 8,152 5,000 8,000 20,527.4 28,000 48,500 34,563.3
Import and 
export




32.60 329.30 518.60 1,735 n.a. 4,800 2,968
1. SSEOP = Shenzhen Socioeconomic Outline Plan; FYP = Five-Year Plan.
2. SSE10YDP = Shenzhen Socioeconomic 10-Year Development Plan.
3. GOVI = Gross output value of  industry.
4. For entire city.
Source: Figures for Five-Year Plan targets are for SDPB, 2002, various pages; actual data are from SSB, 2002, pp. 44-47.
From Mee Kam Ng and Wing-Shing Tang, “The Role of  Planning in the Development of  Shenzhen, China,” Eurasian Geography and 
Economics, 2004.
276 |"SIPA’s Entrepreneurship & Policy Initiative Working Paper Series  _______________________________________________________
Appendix 4
Shenzhen Per Capita GDP Growth 1980–2006
GDP Per Capita in China, Guangdong, Pearl River Delta and the City of  Shenzhen 1980–2006
Year China Guangdong Pearl River Delta City of Shenzhen
1980 (RMB) 463 481 500 835
1985 (RMB) 858 1,026 n.a. 4,809
1990 (RMB) 1,644 2,484 3,148 8,724
1995 (RMB) 5,046 8,129 18,242 19,550
2000 (RMB) 7,858 12,736 18,094 32,800
2005 (RMB) 14,040 24,438 41,990 60,801
2006 (RMB) 15,973 28,332 49,153 69,450
2006 (US$) 2,004 3,554 6,166 8,712
Note: US$1=RMB7.9718 in 2006 [53]. GDP per capita in Pearl River Delta in 1980–95 was based on hukou population and would be smaller than the figure if  large 
total population was used.
From Jianfa Shen, “Urban Growth and Sustainable Development in Shenzhen City 1980–2006”
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Appendix 5
Shenzhen Population Growth 1979–2006





























1979 0.31 0.31 99.52 0.00 0.48 n.a. n.a.
1980 0.33 0.32 96.40 0.01 3.60 0.02 73.39
1981 0.37 0.33 91.01 0.03 8.99 0.03 82.91
1985 0.88 0.48 54.29 0.40 45.71 0.14 97.09
1986 0.94 0.51 54.99 0.42 45.01 0.05 91.96
1990 1.68 0.69 40.92 0.99 59.08 0.26 96.60
1991 2.27 0.73 32.29 1.54 67.71 0.59 98.34
1995 4.49 0.99 22.08 3.50 77.92 0.36 96.97
1997 5.28 1.09 20.74 4.18 79.26 0.45 97.51
2000 7.01 1.25 17.81 5.76 82.19 0.69 97.84
2005 8.28 1.82 21.98 6.46 78.02 0.27 91.95
2006 8.46 1.97 23.25 6.50 76.75 0.19 87.10
From Jianfa Shen, “Urban Growth and Sustainable Development in Shenzhen City 1980–2006”
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Appendix 6
Shenzhen Government Subsidies and Financing for High-Technology Enterprises
Subsidy Amount Eligibility
Start-up subsidy ¥5,000 ($785) per founder, with a maximum 
allowance of ¥50,000 ($7,850)
Startups in operation for at least 6 months;  
can apply only once
Rental subsidy Year 1, at least 80% of annual rent; Year 2, at least 
50% of annual rent; Year 3, at least 20% of annual 
rent: maximum allowance of ¥6,000 ($942) a year 
for 3 years
Certified startups (based in the Entrepreneurship 
Incubator Zone), technology-related startups,  
and overseas students can apply
Social security subsidy 100% of social security payments for a maximum 
3 years
Any startup can apply
Employment subsidy $314–$417 per head for a team, maximum $4,170 Any startup can apply
Micro-financing A loan of ¥200,000 ($31,400) per founder, with  
a maximum per firm of ¥2 million ($314,000)
Any startup can apply
Peacock Campaign ¥800,000–¥1.5 million ($125,628–$235,552) 
for overseas talent, with a maximum ¥80 million 
($12.56 million) per team
High-achieving professionals, (e.g., Nobel prize 
winners); top management in government-
recognized technology; and innovation companies 
can apply
Table composed by Sally Qiu, SIPA, Columbia University, from public sources.
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Appendix 7
Government-Owned Venture Funds in Shenzhen
Fund Amount Sponsors and Shareholders Focus
State Venture Fund#213  
(August 2016)
US$30 billion China Reform Holding Corp 
Ltd. (Main Sponsor);  
China Postal Savings Banks; 
China Construction Bank Corp; 
Shenzhen Investment Holdings
Support innovation and 
industrial technology upgrades
China Internet  
Investment Fund#214  
(January 2017)
RMB 100 billion  
(US$15.7 billion)
State-owned banks and 
companies, with oversight  
by the Cyberspace 
Administration of China and 
Ministry of Finance
Invest in equity of Chinese 
Internet companies
Premier Ventures#215  
(March 2018)
US$160 million HTC (Taiwan phone maker) 
and Shenzhen Municipal 
People’s Government
Virtual Reality technology 
innovation in China
Shenzhen Blockchain Fund#216 
(April 2018)
RMB 500 million  
(US$79.2 million)
Shenzhen Angel Capital 
Guiding Fund, a Shenzhen 
government-backed early-
stage government guidance 
fund, will provide 40% of the 
capital. It will be managed 
by Donghai Capital and 
Hengxing Capital, both 
controlled by State-owned 
Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission  
in Shenzhen.
Firms and start-ups using 
blockchain technology
Shenzhen Angel  
Investment Guidance Fund#217 
(March 2018)
RMB 5 billion  
(US$780 million)
Set up by Shenzhen 
Government Investment 
Guidance Fund; overseer 
Shenzhen Investment Holdings 
Co., Ltd. and Shenzhen 
Innovation Investment Group 
Co., Ltd. To be jointly managed 
by two Shenzhen SOEs
Transformation, industrial 
upgrades, and innovation
Table composed by Sally Qiu, SIPA, Columbia University, from public sources.
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Appendix 8
Representative Shenzhen Incubators/Accelerators
Incubator/Accelerator Theme Year Launched
Haxlr8r Hardware 2011
Weiyouhui Incubation Park Tech (software, app, information system development) 2014
3W Tech/general business 2010
Entrepreneurial Magic Cube General business 2015
Chaihuo Maker Space Hardware 2008
Table composed by Sally Qiu, SIPA, Columbia University, from public sources.
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